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Abstract
Theories of government formation and duration have been subjected to rigorous empirical
testing. Numerous articles each argue for their own approach, pointing to an empirical
model with significant explanation power. Being in a position to gather data not used
in government formation and duration classics, this thesis has the benefit of testing their
predictive power out-of-sample. The main question is: Can the models predict what they
say they can explain when facing unseen observations? Another question at the forefront
of explaining the life cycle of governments is the trade-offs regarding a cornerstone in
political science methodology - decreasing or increasing complexity of the models which
are tested. Recent literature on the life cycle of governments have pulled in the respective
directions. This thesis sets out to empirically evaluate the trade-off between parsimony
and complexity.
The empirical evaluation can be summed up in two main points: Only one out of
the four original models predict new observations better than how they predict the
original sample. Complex modeling of government formation yields more predictive power
compared to the more parsimonious approach. Parsimonious modeling of government
duration has more predictive power compared to complex modeling.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The life cycle of governments is a cornerstone in legislative studies. The making
and breaking of governments in parliamentary democracies are opaque processes. The
situation is the following; a change in government is demanded, whether on the basis
of an election, a resigned incumbent government, a change in the parties represented in
government, or a change in the prime minister post. As is often the case in parliamentary
democracies, single party majority governments are rare (Gallagher et al. 2011, 413). The
individual parties, consequently, must bargain with other parties to find a viable cabinet.
This process often occurs in private, smoke-filled rooms. In the end the result is a new
government. How can one explain the process of forming a government, going from the
smoke-filled rooms to a viable cabinet? The unobservable features of the bargaining lay
the ground for competing explanations of the government formation phase.
Immediately after the cabinet has formed, the termination clock starts ticking. Some
governments last longer than others. Is the duration dependent on unpredictable critical
events, such as personal scandals or financial crises? Or can attributes of the political
system and the political actors involved explain government duration? This thesis seeks
to evaluate the predictive power of theories in both the formation and the duration phase
of the life cycle of governments in parliamentary democracies.
1.1 The Life Cycle of Governments
The life cycle of governments has been subjected to deep theoretical coverage, and the
theories have subsequently been exposed to heavy empirical testing. Contributions range
from formal models and case studies to cross-national, quantitative studies. Theories
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have most often been directed towards explaining the formation and the termination of
governments. My study will evaluate renowned studies from both fields. I will test their
out-of-sample predictive power as a mean for evaluating how well the models perform.
Earlier works have resorted to evaluate their models in terms of how well the model
explains and fits the data, mostly by looking at statistical significance, direction and
strength of the effects and residual statistics. Ba¨ck and Dumont (2007) takes this a step
further and calculates the in-sample predicted probability of a coalition formation. The
problem is that the predictions stem from the same sample the model is fitted on. Taking
empirical evaluations a step further, I will utilize the out-of-sample method to evaluate
the predictive power of the models.
The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s brought on significant theoretical,
methodological, and empirical advances in both fields. This guides the selection of articles
evaluated in this thesis. I have chosen models that uses real-world data up until the end
of the 1980s. This is mainly because the most cited empirical models in both fields are
either published around the 1990s, or they use data only covering the period up until
1990. The next task is to gather updated data. I will stretch this time series to include
the most recent governments, using both existing and self-coded data. The final step is
to analyse the predictions of the original articles using data from 1945 up until today.
Recent contributions have stressed the need for improvement in the study of the life
cycle of governments. Golder et al. (2012b) approaches the field of government formation
in a new way. Their main argument is simple - models of government formation does
not predict the phenomenons it sets out to because the models are too complex. A
model which only considers two institutional constraints is better at predicting different
phases of the formation process than models making many more constraints and using
more indicators (Golder et al. 2012b, 443). Chiba et al. (2015), looking at government
duration, suggest going towards higher complexity. The argument in the article is that
government duration is dependent on the government formations process. In effect, they
estimate both the formation and duration processes simultaneously.
The more general argument from this debate is the discussions of how to model the
life cycle of governments in terms of more parsimony or more complexity. This serves
as the rationale behind the selection of original articles to evaluate. I will use one less
complex and one more complex model in both the formation and duration literature. The
2
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predictive power of each will be used as evidence for going in one direction rather than
the other regarding modeling the life cycle of governments.
1.2 Government Formation
The number of different study subjects within the government formation research reflect
the complexity of the formation process. An early aim in the literature was explaining
the variation in types of government (see for example Crombez (1996)) - would the
government formation bargaining result in a minority, a minimal winning, or a surplus
majority government? Advances in the explanations lead to new areas of research on the
formation process. A more recent project has been directed towards explaining cabinet
composition (see for example Martin and Stevenson (2001, 2010)). This field seeks to
explain which of all the potential cabinets are chosen. This thesis will focus on a third
large government formation field, namely formation delays in parliamentary democracies.
This field was deduced from the observed variation in the duration of formation bargaining
processes. Some countries experienced longer bargaining periods than others. This
variation breached with the theoretical prediction of no formation delays from renowned
bargaining models, such as the bargaining model proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Three empirical contributions stand out as important for the field of explaining
bargaining delays. Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) represents the first published
cross-national quantitative study on bargaining delays, and also the first of the formation
models that will be evaluated in this thesis. Models from non-cooperative game theory
does not predict any formation delay (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). In light of observing
that formation delays in reality often stretches over a certain period of time, Diermeier
and van Roozendaal (1998) sought an explanation using an information uncertainty
approach. They point out that understanding the bargaining process - what happens
between an election or other government termination and formation of a new government
- is a vital part of understanding the formation process as a whole. They ground their
theoretical argument in non-cooperative bargaining theory, where actors have incomplete
information. Their main argument is that information uncertainty among the government
actors about the government formation process has substantial explanation power on the
duration of the government formation process. Whereas Diermeier and van Roozendaal
(1998) argued for the information uncertainty approach, Martin and Vanberg (2003)
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took an alternative approach. Their main claim is that complexity in the bargaining
environment explains variation in the observed bargaining duration rather than the
uncertainty approach.
Golder (2010) unifies the information uncertainty and bargaining complexity
approaches. This is the second article I will evaluate in the government formation field.
In the article, the effects of the bargaining complexity indicators contingent on the level
of uncertainty in the bargaining situation is estimated. When combining two theoretical
approaches into one explanation of bargaining delays, the article takes a step towards
increased theoretical complexity. Therefore, the Golder (2010) article will be used as
the complex approach of modeling bargaining delays, while the information uncertainty
approach by Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) will be used as the more parsimonious
approach.
1.2.1 Back to basics?
Models which are unsuitable to the real world must be revised. Golder et al.
(2012b), motivated by the failure of theoretical models to predict the observed variation
in the government formation process, seeks to replace earlier contributions with a
’zero-intelligence’ model of government formation. Their main claim is that formation
models, to be able to theoretically predict the formation process, must go back to basics.
Their theoretical model puts only two constraints on the formation process - that there
always exists an incumbent government and that the government must have majority
support in the legislature. The ’zero-intelligence’ concept comes from economics. The
zero-intelligent agent is ”one who acts randomly subject to minimal constraints” (Golder
et al. 2012b, 429). This means that institutional constraints guide individual behavior.
But it does not mean that other contextual factors are not important. The main
motivation behind the article is to empirically predict different stages of the government
formation process, not to explain ”the bargaining behavior of actors included in the
government formation process” (Golder et al. 2012b, 429). To prove that their model
performs better than the existing ones, the authors test their model on three government
formation research areas - government type, bargaining duration and portfolio allocation.
They show that their models predict real world observations better than any of the other
approaches in the fields.
4
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In a reply, Martin and Vanberg (2014) criticized the model for being to reliant on
the random proposal mechanism. The random proposal mechanism in the Golder et al.
(2012b) approach suggests that there are no rules which guide when and how parties
propose coalition alternatives. This random proposal mechanism rejects the importance
of the bargaining model introduced by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). The bargaining model
gives great weight to the actor with the power of giving the first proposal, the formateur.
The selection of the formateur follows an exogenous selection rule. This assumption
was not supposed to be realistic in the first place, but Golder et al. (2012b) decide to
remove all of the formateur assumptions. Combined with the rest of their approach, the
’zero-intelligence’ model could be interpreted as an attempt of pushing coalition theory
in the direction of weighting country-specific institutional structures the most (Diermeier
2014, 35).
Having established the complexity of the government formation process, an overview
of the life cycle of governments is incomplete without including the process of duration and
termination of the governments. The following section introduces the field of government
duration.
1.3 Government Duration
Government stability is vital to the functioning of parliamentary democracies and has
been a study subject since the 1970s (Laver 2003, 23). The duration of a government is
an observable phenomenon. A government takes office one day and exits the same offices
some months or years later. But what is the probability of a present or future government
to break down? This is a question which many have tried to model.
Early research focused on how exogenous events controlled the termination of
governments. In particular, Browne et al. (1984, 1986) did systematic research on
government duration, the introduction of the critical events approach as the most
important contribution. They claimed that the termination of governments could be
explained mostly by critical events such as economic shocks, scandals or deaths within
the cabinet. Their claim was backed by the observation that the actual distribution of
terminations was close to the random poisson distribution (Laver 2003, 28).
A different approach wanted to incorporate both cabinet- and institution specific
attributes into a regression framework on explaining terminations. Strøm (1985) was
5
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one of the main proponents of the attributes approach. The main claim from this
camp was that an explanation of government termination could not only focus on critical
events. Cabinet characteristics and institutional design of the political systems had to
have explanatory power on how long governments lasted (Laver 2003, 28).
In this thesis, I will evaluate two government duration classics. The first is the only
book-length coverage of government survival, written by Paul Warwick (1994). The second
is an article by Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). These two works further developed the
usage of the event history models to empirically model government duration. Event
history analysis, often also called survival analysis, helped researchers to unify the the
government duration field by estimating both critical events and attributes at the same
time - that is, the simultaneous estimation of the underlying hazard of government
breakdown and how different covariates influenced the risk of termination.
The rationale for choosing these two studies as replication for my study is
straightforward - Warwick (1994) represents the parsimonious theoretical account of
government duration. The model I evaluate from Warwick (1994) represents one of
his most prominent theoretical contributions - the introduction of cabinet ideological
diversity as an indicator of government duration. The approach from Diermeier and
Stevenson (1999) introduces the strategic actor assumption to government duration.
Operationalized, this meant that cabinets would seize the possibility of maximising utility
by choosing to terminate in order of gaining power in the following step. This meant that
Diermeier and Stevenson tested an assumption that governments ended in two different
modes, one in replacement and the other in legislative dissolution. Hence, the Diermeier
and Stevenson (1999) approach represents the more theoretically complex approach, while
the Warwick approach is framed as the more parsimonious model.
1.4 Evaluating Theories Empirically
A heavy focus on one direction of philosophy of science needs to be justified. I will base
my conclusions on the predictive power of models of formation and duration. The failure
of a model to predict an outcome will be used as supporting evidence for improving or
renewing theoretical approaches. My approach leans on an argument which says that
theories able to explain but not to predict represent less theoretical improvement than
theories which are shown to both explain and predict (Shmueli 2010, 292).
6
1.4. Evaluating Theories Empirically
How have formation and duration theories been evaluated empirically? Both
literatures have found important empirical evidence. However, the theoretical validity
of has been drawn on the basis of statistical significant effects. This way of empirically
testing the explanatory power of theories is a necessary step, but does not represent an
evaluation broad enough for making far-reaching inferences regarding the performance of
the underlying theories.
In this thesis, I evaluate the predictive power of four empirical models from different
theoretical perspectives in the government formation and duration literature. My
contribution stems from a growing sense in the field of political science that significance
testing is not the only way to test theoretical predictions. A result table in a scholarly
article is a result of one draw from a distribution of coefficients that could possibly describe
the relationship between two social or political variables. As Ward et al. (2010) has pointed
out, this is not the way of advancing empirical testing of theories, and hence no way of
advancing theoretical work in light of empirical evidence in the formation and duration
literature.
Ward et al. (2010) is one of the first articles in political science which implements the
out-of-sample method in order of estimating the predictive power of theoretical models.
Hill Jr. and Jones (2014) is a more recent article which uses the field of state repression
to show how and why quantitative political science articles should include out-of-sample
evaluations of statistical models. In addition to the substantive claims I make in this
thesis, I also aim to contribute to this increasing trend towards arguing that p-values do
not represent a sufficient tool for evaluating the performance and utility of theoretical
models.
The danger of over-fitting is imminent in research fields with limited data. Over-fitting
is a generic term. In this context it is used to mean that empirical results do not generalize
to new data. In effect, this can mean that empirical testing of formation and duration
theories have been results of specific circumstances in the specific data sets used and not
general trends which support the causality which is modeled. Hence, the empirical results
that have been published in the fields are results of model that have been over-fitted to
the specific data set and therefore do not inhibit predictive capability.
The out-of-sample framework enables researchers to evaluate the generalizability of
their empirical results with greater confidence. The original results are used to test
7
1.4. Evaluating Theories Empirically
predictions in a new data set. The deviances between the observations in the new data
set and how the original model predicts the new observations can be used as evidence
for claiming that original articles does not generalize well. Low generalization can be
interpreted in the direction of the model being over-fitted to the data, the consequences
of which is described in chapter 3.
The approaches used in Ward et al. (2010), and in this thesis, are made possible
due to computational developments. The theoretical accounts of government formation
and duration was heavily tested around 19901. The period since has been represented
by enormous advances in technology. Therefore, this thesis is not a critique of previous
empirical testing. It represents instead a significant improvement of how to evaluate
theories in government formation and duration.
An overarching issue regarding the evaluation of statistical models is choosing between
parsimonious and complex models. Parsimony is often fronted as the panacea of the social
sciences. This trade-off is important to my thesis because of the theme underlying the
ongoing debate between Golder et al. (2012b), Martin and Vanberg (2014) and Golder
et al. (2014). As mentioned in section 1.2.1, Golder et al. (2012b) wants to go back to
basics in the formal modeling of government formation. On the opposite side is the Martin
and Vanberg article where the authors more or less want to keep the status quo regarding
the theoretical modeling of government formation. The underlying question of the debate
is: what is the cost of complexity? Golder et al. (2012b) show how they successfully
predict different stages of the formation process by simulating values based on the two
institutional constraints. However, how does one interpret the results from a model which
is only two constitutional constraints away from being a model of pure randomness?
This trade-off guides the selection of replications I have chosen. Regarding government
formation literature, the Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) article tests one theoretical
approach towards explaining bargaining duration, while the Golder (2010) article
combines both the Diermeier and van Roozendaal approach and the Martin and Vanberg
(2003) approach as described in section 1.2. The assumptions behind the empirical test
is more complex than the approach from Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998). The
predictive power test will give a basis for claiming something about which of the models
1Except of the articles and book under evaluation here comes for example Laver and Schofield (1990),
Strøm (1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1996) which all contributed heavily to theorize the life cycle of
governments.
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that predicts the outcome the best.
Regarding the government duration literature, the Warwick (1994) approach
represents the basic version of a government duration model. The second replication
represents a further development of the Warwick approach. The Diermeier and Stevenson
(1999) article pursues, following newly published theoretical accounts, that actors involved
in the life cycle of governments are not only cooperative. The non-cooperative theoretical
account suggest that dissolving a cabinet yield further gains than remaining in office
until the general election. Hence, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) estimates the duration
of governments as two different processes - one where the cabinet ends in replacement
and one where it strategically dissolves and calls a new election. This competing risk
framework serves as a theoretically more complex approach than Warwick (1994).
The guiding research question in this thesis is motivated by the most recent approaches
to the fields of government formation and duration. Golder et al. (2012b) wants formation
models to be built from the ground up using a parsimonious theoretical model. Chiba
et al. (2015), on the other hand, wants the research agenda to incorporate formation and
duration to one continuous process. This is a clear argument for increasing the complexity
in how researches model the life cycle of governments. Therefore, my research question is
the following: How well does parsimonious and complex theoretical models in the fields
of government formation and duration generalize when faced with new data?
1.5 Outline
The following section describes how I will proceed in evaluating theories in government
formation and duration, contextualized by the research question at the end of the previous
section.
Chapter 2 introduces the state of the art of both government formation and duration
literature. The chapter is directed towards explaining the theoretical development in both
fields in general by pointing to the explicit theoretical implications which are being tested.
Secondly, I will show how the articles evaluated chose their indicators and the theoretical
rationale behind the selection of predictors.
Chapter 3 goes through the research design. Firstly, I will display the data underlying
this thesis. Secondly, I will describe the variables used, and the sources used in situations
where I needed to code new data. Thirdly, I will focus on how to test predictive power
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empirically. Finally, a section will be used to discuss theoretical and practical problems
of using the chosen statistical models.
Chapter 4 presents the evaluation of the government formation models. Here, I will
first show that my data gives the same substantial conclusions as the original models. I
start the evaluation by describing the in-sample predictive performance of the models.
This will be used as a motivator for part two of the evaluation which is the out-of-sample
predictions. Here, I describe the results both graphically and substantially. The third
section test the models using the cross validation method. The last section sums up the
chapter.
Chapter 5 evaluates the government duration models. The same procedure will be
applied as in 4. I will show through substantial effects how my data is comparable to the
original data. Then the in-sample, out-of-sample and cross validation methods will be
applied. This chapter will also end with a section summarizing the results.
Chapter 6 nuances the in-sample, out-of-sample and cross validation results from
chapters 4 and 5. Here, I show how the models are able to predict the 25th quantile,
median and the 75th quantile. This section will also show the large deviances between
the predicted and observed duration. This will be used to motivate the final section which
investigates an alternative way of calculating prediction error.
Chapter 7 deals with the summary and the implications of the analysis. Firstly, I will
summarize the main findings. Secondly, I will discuss challenges and possible solutions to
the empirical and theoretical modeling of government formation and duration.
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CHAPTER 2
Making and Breaking Governments
Two questions stand out in the literature on the life cycle of governments: which
governments form, and what explains the duration of governments (Diermeier 2014, 41).
This chapter introduces literature that have evolved around these two questions, that is
- around the subjects of making and breaking governments.
2.1 Formation
”The government formation literature is one of the largest literatures in all of political
science” (Golder et al. 2012b, 443). Significant attention has been focused on many
different aspects of how governments are forming in parliamentary democracies. The
theoretical development on the bargaining process surrounding the formation point stems
from game theorists. Country experts have also contributed with their detailed knowledge
of the individual political system, and the country-specific characteristics of the formation
process (Martin and Stevenson 2001, 33). The area is therefore rich, especially regarding
theoretical accounts of the formation process.
First, this section introduces the theoretical development surrounding the specific
feature of government formation this thesis looks into - namely the formation duration.
The main theoretical accounts are the information uncertainty approach and the combined
information uncertainty and bargaining complexity approach. This section will also
present the empirical implications derived from these two different theoretical explanations
of formation duration.
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2.1.1 Information uncertainty
The actuality of the study of government formation duration was revitalized in light of
the Belgian formation process that lasted from early 2010 to late 2011, making it a total
of 541 days since the last election (Devos and Sinardet 2012, 167). Empirical models of
government formation have used delays in the formation process as indicating political
crises. This is so because of the prominent bargaining model proposed by Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). The bargaining model yields no room, theoretically, for any formation
delay. Hence, observed delays such as the recent example from Belgium caused legislative
study researchers to investigate the empirical clear deviance from the bargaining model.
The bargaining process as laid out by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) is shown in figure 2.1.
The bargaining model assumes rational actors with complete information, and decisions
under majority rule. The guiding assumption is the existence of a political party with
the agenda power of making the first proposal, often called the formateur (Druckman
et al. 2014, 202). The proposal from the chosen formateur consist of a distribution of
pay-offs regarding cabinet positions. A clear implication is that the proposal from the
formateur will immediately be accepted by all actors - because of the complete information
assumption.
Formateur selection Government proposal from formateur
Agreement by majority rule
Rejection of formateur proposal
Government formation
Figure 2.1: The Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model. Based on description in Golder et al. (2012, 428).
However, as with Belgium and other parliamentary democracies, the empirical backing
for the formal bargaining model is slim. Only when the information assumption is relaxed
is it possible to theoretically predict formation delays (Golder 2010, 19). Therefore,
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) suggests testing an implication of the incomplete
information bargaining approach - ”the degree of uncertainty over relevant bargaining
parameters is positively correlated with the expected formation time” (Diermeier and van
Roozendaal 1998, 612). Formation delay, then, becomes a function of political actors’
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information uncertainty regarding preferences and strategies of the other political actors
in the formation bargaining.
The parties, knowing that they have uncertain information of the preferences and
strategies of the other actors, can benefit from using different institutional opportunities,
such as inner-cabinet negotiations or policy-specific agreements (De Winter and Dumont
2008, 134-135). However, the consequence of parties searching for information through
these kinds of institutional characteristics is formation duration.
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) uses two indicators to investigate the empirical
validity of the information uncertainty approach. The first indicator is the timing of the
government formation bargaining - whether the bargaining happens immediately after or
in between elections. Theoretically, governmental actors have more information about the
preferences and strategies of the other actors when they have interacted over some time
in the parliament (Diermeier and van Roozendaal 1998, 620). A government bargaining
which happens in an inter-election period has this characteristic. The opposite happens
in an post-election context. The game has changed as a consequence of an election.
Following, there are new party platforms, new policy goals and in some cases also changes
to the legislative party composition. The actors then have yet to experience the real
preferences of the other actors in the legislature. Since formation bargaining is often
guided by parties having to reach a comprise on a viable governing policy agreement
(Gallagher et al. 2011, 419), government formations are delayed because of higher levels
of information uncertainty among the bargaining actors.
The second indicator of information uncertainty is the mode of termination for the
previous cabinet. The argument is that a previously defeated governments, indicated by
a cabinet loss to a confidence-vote or other oppositional pressure leading to termination,
leads to leadership battles within parties. One thing is to lose after an election,
another thing is to be politically beaten in the parliament. Therefore, party leaders
can be challenged by ambitious party members inside their own party. This conflictual
environment, caused by the previous defeat, decreases the degree of trust in the
information which is available to the other parties. Hence, this also decreases the level
of information on the real preferences of the other actors. The information uncertainty
indicators and their expected effects on bargaining duration are summed up in table 2.1
below.
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Table 2.1: Information uncertainty indicators, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Variable Expectation
Post-Election Government formation duration increases in light of a post-election
context relative to an inter-election context.
Previous Defeat Government formation duration is longest in situations where there exist
leadership battles as a result of a previous parliamentary defeat.
2.1.2 Combining information uncertainty and bargaining complexity
Martin and Vanberg (2003) argue for a bargaining complexity approach rather than the
information uncertainty approach by Diermeier and van Roozendaal. The bargaining
complexity approach is characterized by the assumption that a complex bargaining
situation yields increased bargaining duration, compared to a simple bargaining situation.
Martin and Vanberg (2003) uses indicators such as the effective number of parties in
the legislature and ideological diversity inside the cabinet to operationalize bargaining
complexity. The rationale behind the inclusion of the effective number of parties is that
it leads to an increased number of possible government options, and hence, whoever
is guiding the bargaining must consider more options than in a bargaining with fewer
government options. This argument and the subsequent empirical implication comes from
the government formation classic by Laver and Schofield (1990), and have since been the
most used indicator of bargaining complexity (De Winter and Dumont 2008, 136).
Golder (2010) combines the two theoretical approaches. The main argument in
the article is that an explanation of bargaining duration is not either uncertainty or
complexity. Information uncertainty always affects delays in government formation, and
the effect of complexity is contingent on uncertainty among the actors (Golder 2010, 9).
The reasoning is simple - complexity indicators are known to the actors involved in the
bargaining. This is the main reason for Golder to expect that the effects of the complexity
indicators either gives constant or decreasing formation delays. In effect, theoretically,
this means that complexity should not yield any effect in inter-election contexts. When
there exist uncertainty among the actors about the preferences and strategies of the other
actors involved in the bargaining, the effect of bargaining complexity should indicate a
further increase in formation delays. For Golder, the uncertainty approach has therefore
causal priority compared to the complexity approach (Golder 2010, 12). To measure
information uncertainty Golder uses only the post-election indicator.
The bargaining complexity indicators used by Golder include the effective number of
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parties mentioned above, Ideological polarization and positive parliamentarism. Higher
levels of ideological polarization in the legislature will lead to bargaining delays. The
underlying assumption is simple - ideologically tighter connected legislatures can find
a viable government solution quicker than ideologically diverse legislatures. Positive
parliamentarism is defined as an institutional rule which says that the new cabinet must
pass a majority investiture vote in the parliament to officially be invested (Rasch 2004,
115). This indicator is expected to increase complexity, and hence increase formation
delays, because of the explicit demand that the final cabinet must have majority backing
in the legislature. The theoretically relevant indicators for complexity are summarized in
table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Bargaining complexity indicators, Golder (2010)
Variable Expectation
Effective number of A higher number of effective parties increases bargaining duration
parties in legislature contingent on an uncertain context. In inter-election contexts the
expectation is constant or negative effect.
Polarization in Higher levels of polarization within the legislature is expected
legislature to increase bargaining duration in an uncertain context.
Positive parliament- Countries having the investiture rule are expected to have longer
arism bargaining duration contingent on an uncertain context.
2.2 Duration
Whereas the government formation literature has been characterized by a heavy
theoretical focus, the government duration literature has been skewed towards the empirics
(Laver 2003, 38). The result has been that theoretical and empirical accounts of duration
has taken separate ways. The theoretical strand of the duration literature suffers from
the definitional weakness of a priori modeling - the models are static, and not capable
of predicting terminations happening during the lifetime of a cabinet. The duration of
a government is not a static process. This is also why a typical a priori model as the
Baron-Ferejohn model can not be used in duration studies (Diermeier 2014, 43).
This section will introduce developments in the government duration literature. First,
I will describe the early developments in the 1980s, which was based mainly around a
debate between the critical event and the attributes approaches. Second, I will explain
how the field was unified and highlight the ideological approach by Warwick (1994). Third,
the strategic actor assumption is presented and connected to the competing risk approach
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of Diermeier and Stevenson (1999).
2.2.1 Attributes and critical events
Before a unified attempt by King et al. (1990), there was a heated debate between critical
events and attributes approaches on the determinants of government duration. Browne
et al. (1984) represented the critical events approach. This approach lifted the critical
events hypotheses up and into the light. The argument was that the attributes approach
essentially assumed that ”governments more likely to form are also likely to endure
longer” (Browne et al. 1988, 931). Browne et al., instead, claimed that the attributes
approach had to be amended by taking critical events into a more complete account of
government duration. The critical events are never explicitly defined in the literature,
but implicitly understood as outside events like economic shocks, minister scandals and
other non-structural events which causes a government termination (Strøm 1988, 926).
Against this, Strøm (1985, 1988) argued for the attributes approach. He claimed that
cabinet duration had causal structures which could be best revealed by using institutional
and cabinet specific predictors. Opposite to the critical events approach, where cabinet
termination only could be explained by randomness, the turn towards the attributes
approach was a significant progress towards giving a systematic of the observed variation
in government duration.
After King et al. (1990) the debate between the two competing approaches slowed
down. By introducing the event history model framework, King et al. (1990) became
a milestone for the government duration literature. The real benefit of using the event
history model compared to the flawed OLS-framework used before them was that both
attributes and critical events could be estimated simultaneously. The concept of the
baseline hazard replaced critical events, and the attributes could contribute to explain
the systematic variation in government duration. Hence, the field of government duration
was unified.
King et al. (1990) also introduced the concept of censoring governments that sat the
whole period, but were terminated due to a constitutionally mandated election. These
governments could be assumed to have survived longer if there had not been an election.
King et al. (1990, 853) chose to censor every government that sat within 12 months of the
forthcoming constitutionally mandated election. The specifications King et al. chose had
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several shortcomings. This was corrected in a book-length coverage by Warwick (1994),
and will be discussed below. However, more importantly here, Warwick retained some of
the attributes used by King et al. (1990).
These attributes are summed up in table 2.3, along with their expected effect on
government duration. A majority cabinet is expected to last longer than cabinets without
majority support in the legislature. The logic is straightforward - majority cabinets
can not be beaten by the legislature, unless one of the governing parties turns on
them. The post-election indicator measures the effect that a cabinet invested in the
beginning of a constitutionally mandated period will have the opportunity to sit longer
than inter-election cabinets. Cabinets that have passed the investiture vote have been
showed trust by the legislature, and hence these cabinets are expected to last longer than
cabinets in countries that do not practice investiture.
Table 2.3: Attributes of government duration, Warwick (1994)
Variable Expectation
Majority status Majority cabinets have longer duration than minorities.
Post-election Post-election cabinets have longer duration compared to
status inter-election cabinets.
Investiture Cabinets passing the investiture rule are expected to have
the longest government duration.
One of the main surges in Warwick (1994) was to replace the exponentially distributed
hazard of termination used in King et al. (1990). The exponential parametrization of the
baseline hazard means that the King et. al. (1990) article expected the hazard rate
to be flat, i.e. the risk of cabinet termination remains constant, independent of how
long the cabinet had been in power (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 22). Warwick’s
point was that the Cox proportional hazard model gave more theoretically sense. In the
Cox proportional hazard model the baseline hazard of termination is left unspecified,
and hence the hazard does not need to follow an assumed distribution as the parametric
survival models must1. Therefore, Warwick argued that this approach was a better way
of testing attributes and critical events without having to expect a certain distribution of
government duration.
Another key development brought on by Warwick (1994) was to introduce indicators
of the policy-seeking government actor to the study of cabinet duration. Essentially,
1For more on the cox proportional hazard model and other survival models, see Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones (2004, 47-68).
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the policy-seeking2 government actor is not only concerned with getting into office and
stay there. The actor is also concerned with introducing and implementing the favoured
policies of the actor. Warwick claimed that earlier studies neglected the fact that
ideological distances within the cabinet had large consequences for how long the cabinet
lasted.
Table 2.4 summarizes the ideological indicators used by Warwick. Warwick uses three
dimensions to evaluate the policy-seeking assumption, the general left/right dimension,
clerical versus secular dimension and the regime support dimension. These are the
ideological indicators, amongst other measures and dimensions which is reported to have
a significant impact on government duration (Warwick 1994, 59). The expected effect
of ideological distance is that larger policy deviances between cabinet parties can lead
to severe conflicts, and higher levels of conflict increases the probability of termination.
Hence, higher levels of policy diversity within the cabinet should cause shorter government
durations.
Table 2.4: Policy-seeking indicators, Warwick (1994)
Variable Expectation
Left-Right diversity Increased left-right cabinet diversity decreases expected
government duration.
Clerical-Secular Increased clerical-secular cabinet diversity decreases expected
diversity government duration.
Regime Support Increased regime support cabinet diversity decreases expected
diversity government duration
2.2.2 Strategic dissolution
King et al. (1990) and Warwick (1994) assume implicitly that all cabinet actors want to
stay in government as long as they can. This means that strategic decisions by parties
is left out of the early explanations of government duration. Lupia and Strøm (1995)
introduced a formal model with the strategic actor assumption. Cabinet parties, in
countries where the constitution mandates the executive the opportunity of dissolving the
legislature and calling a new election, have the possibility of strategically choose to opt out
of government. Lupia and Strøm (1995), therefore, formalized a game which could explain
the benefits from strategically bringing down the cabinet (Laver 2003, 35). Implications of
this strategic approach has been under some empirical scrutiny, for example by Strøm and
2The policy-seeking assumption is often attributed to Riker (1962).
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Swindle (2002). They validate empirically that dissolutions happens, and they explain
the presence of the strategic choice of ending a cabinet with indicators such as the role
of the actor responsible for enacting the dissolution (Strøm and Swindle 2002, 575). This
supports the argument that government terminations are not random events - they can
be explained by systematic indicators3.
The inclusion of the strategic actor assumption represented great progress in the
government duration field. The Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) article attempts to
validate the strategic actor assumption by testing empirically implications of Lupia and
Strøm (1995) model. Lupia and Strøm (1995) claims that there exist two separate
processes of government termination which strategic actors can take advantage of. One
mode of termination is the choice of dissolving the parliament and calling new elections.
This is done because the governmental actors calculate more benefits from dissolving
the parliament and calling new elections than staying in office until the end of the
constitutionally mandated period. The other mode of termination is situations in which
cabinet changes do not directly follow from elections, and hence it does not involve
dissolution and the calling of new elections. The decision to be replaced is also a strategic
choice, where the benefits of being replaced beats the cost of staying in office until the next
election (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 1052). The termination indicators are summed
up in table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Mode of government termination, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Variable Expectation
Dissolution termination Cabinets ending in dissolutions are expected to have
an increasing hazard of failure.
Replacement termination Cabinets ending in replacements are expected to have constant or
decreasing hazard of failure.
3And, often times, these indicators are institutional rules, (Strøm and Swindle 2002, 589).
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CHAPTER 3
Research Design
In the following section, I will describe the data underlying this thesis. Additionally, I will
explain the sources and the methods behind the data I have gathered. The second section
outlines how the empirical models will be evaluated - that is, in-sample, out-of-sample and
5-fold cross validation. The main surge here is directed towards explaining the benefits of
doing out-of-sample prediction. The section also presents the cross validation method as
an additional method which as well adapted to research areas with restricted data. The
last section gives a walk-through regarding the statistical models which will be used in
the analyses. Additionally, I will discuss problems and a proposed solution regarding the
statistical modeling of government formation and duration.
3.1 Data
I have based my data collection on the cabinet counting regime in the European
Representative Democracy Data base (ERD) (Andersson et al. 2014). The origin of this
data set is the data as presented in Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000). The most recently updated
version of the ERD data set contains cabinet-level data on 29 European countries from
1945 to 2012. It has also updated errors and other misspecifications from the original
Mu¨ller and Strøm data.
Table 3.1 below shows descriptives of the countries which will be used in the replication
of the original models of government formation and duration. Table 3.2 shows cabinets
after 1989 up until the most recent data point. This is the data which will be used in
the out-of-sample prediction approach. Included are also statistics over how the cabinets
are coded due to their mode of termination, and how they are censored. This data is
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elaborated on in the variable section, below1.
Table 3.1: Cabinets 1945 - 1989
Country Period N cabinets Duration Barg. duration Replacements Dissolutions Pooled Censored
Austria 1945-1987 17 921 35 7 8 15 2
Belgium 1946-1988 30 514 42 18 10 28 2
Canada 1945-1988 18 964 4 8 12 6
Denmark 1945-1988 26 625 9 5 16 21 5
Finland 1945-1987 39 397 28 27 3 30 7
France 1947-1988 40 393 11 9 5 14 28
Germany 1949-1987 22 666 19 20 2 22 0
Greece 1977-1989 7 639 7 1 2 3 4
Iceland 1944-1989 23 716 22 11 8 19 4
Ireland 1944-1989 18 954 13 2 14 16 2
Italy 1946-1989 42 346 44 35 7 42 0
Luxembourg 1945-1989 14 1240 29 11 2 13 1
Norway 1945-1989 22 738 9 18 0 18 4
Portugal 1976-1987 12 416 54 5 5 10 1
Spain 1977-1989 6 942 30 1 4 5 1
Sweden 1945-1988 22 761 5 17 1 18 4
Netherlands 1946-1989 20 798 78 14 5 19 1
UK 1945-1987 17 960 16 3 10 13 4
Table 3.2: Cabinets 1990 - 2015
Country Period N cabinets Duration Barg. duration Replacements Dissolutions Pooled Censored
Austria 1990-2013 8 975 74 1 3 4 4
Belgium 1991-2010 10 636 42 6 1 7 3
Canada 1993-2015 9 806 1 6 7 2
Denmark 1990-2011 9 839 3 2 5 7 2
Finland 1990-2011 10 736 18 6 0 6 4
France 1991-2012 11 696 1 2 1 3 7
Germany 1990-2013 7 1162 33 2 1 3 4
Greece 1990-2011 8 982 3 0 4 4 4
Iceland 1991-2013 9 884 10 5 0 5 4
Ireland 1992-2011 7 969 20 2 3 5 2
Italy 1991-2011 13 535 44 7 1 8 4
Luxembourg 1994-2013 5 1377 37 0 1 1 4
Norway 1990-2013 8 1029 15 3 0 3 5
Portugal 1991-2011 7 996 21 1 3 4 3
Spain 1993-2011 5 1306 42 0 2 2 3
Sweden 1991-2014 7 1192 8 2 0 2 5
Netherlands 1994-2012 8 748 90 2 3 5 1
UK 1990-2015 7 1271 7 2 2 4 3
One of the main goals of this thesis is to evaluate the generalizability of empirical
models on government formation and duration when tested on new data. For three of
the four original articles replication material was available. However, my reasoning on
collecting all data on my own is that the validity of the data has improved, all the while
there has been much improvement in measurements and data coverage today as opposed
to the end of the 1980’s.
A challenge using newly collected data to replicate data collected in the late 1980’s
1Notes to tables 3.1 and 3.2: The Period column shows the first and the last formation year for
each country in the old data. For the new data, the first year is the formation year and the last is the
termination year. Canada has no value indicating bargaining duration. This is because Canada is not
used in the bargaining duration studies used in this thesis. The censoring and termination data is only
relevant for the government duration studies.
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is the differences in counting cabinets. Differing numbers of governments also gives
differences in the data on duration. The ERD data has in general higher recorded duration,
both regarding bargaining and cabinet duration than the data I am trying to replicate.
The deviances are biggest in countries with the most complex party systems, such as Italy
and Finland. My choice of the ERD stems from the fact that it represents the most recent
approach of collecting and updating cabinet data. Given that newer data is more valid
compared to old data, I will continue forward relying on the ERD data.
3.1.1 Dependent variables
The dependent variables are bargaining duration and government duration. Bargaining
duration measures the length in days between the date of an election or a cabinet
resignation and the following date of the official formation of a new government.
Government duration is measured as the number of days between the official formation
of a cabinet until the official end of a cabinet. The main rule, as has been recognized
throughout the literature (see for example Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000) and Strøm et al.
(2008)) is that a change in cabinet is counted when facing i) an election, ii) a change in
the prime minister position, iii) a successful vote of confidence or iv) technical termination
such as death of prime ministers or changes in party composition.
In the following sections I will describe the sources of the variables, and how they have
been constructed.
3.1.2 ERD data
Post-election: Cabinets forming as a result of an election are expected to have longer
bargaining duration than cabinets formed between elections. This indicator is used in
both of the bargaining duration articles used in this thesis.
Investiture: This structural attribute is included in three of the four models replicated.
Countries that demand an explicit legislative majority for investing the cabinet are coded
as having investiture.
Effective number of parties in the legislature: This variable counts the number of
parties in the legislature and weights the number on the seat share of each party.
Single party majority and majority status: These data are based on the seat share of
each cabinet recorded in ERD. Single party majority cabinets are identified different from
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cabinets with majority status.
Cabinet ideological diversity: Cabinet ideological left-right diversity is calculated using
the rile score, which is calculated from the coding of party manifestos, see Volkens et al.
(2014). The general left-right measure is identified for each party, and the value for
each cabinet is the absolute distance between the most extreme parties according to their
left-right placement.
3.1.3 Other sources
Previous defeat: This covariate is the second information uncertainty indicator, used only
by Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998). The measure consist of termination mode of
the previous cabinet. The theoretical rationale is that a previous defeat leads to longer
duration of government formation because these situations inhibit more conflict between
and within the bargaining parties (Diermeier and van Roozendaal 1998, 620).
I have used data from the ”Party Government Dataset” (PGD) by Woldendorp et al.
(2000) to measure this variable. The data set is recently updated, and covers governments
up until 2012, as discussed in Seki and Williams (2014). The variable from PGD codes
different government termination according to 7 categories. The termination category
I use to find previous defeat is the ”lack of of parliamentary support” category (Seki
and Williams 2015, 9). The PGD data code this variable in cases of a successful
vote-of-confidence2 or where parties withdrew support from the government.
The cabinets are identified and matched by using the date of formation. Where the
formation dates in PGD differed from the cabinets in ERD I recoded the formation dates
in the PGD data to ERD dates. Next, I lag the variable one position, meaning that the
original variable gives the termination mode for the original cabinet, while the lagged
variable gives the termination mode of the previous government.
Caretaker status: Caretaker governments are included in Diermeier and van
Roozendaal (1998) and excluded from the sample in Golder (2010). Diermeier and van
Roozendaal (1998) controls for caretaker governments with a dummy variable. Diermeier
and Stevenson (1999) and Warwick (1994) also use caretaker governments, but they do
not control for their specific effect. Caretaker governments are expected to have shorter
bargaining durations than regular cabinets because they are considered as a short-term
2Successful from the perspective of the instigators of the investiture vote.
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solution that does not really influence the policies implemented (Diermeier and van
Roozendaal 1998, 620). I used the ”Parliament and Government composition database”
(ParlGov) Holger and Manow (2012) to identify cabinets with caretaker status.
Identifiability: This variable is only used by Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998).
The variable comes from Strøm (1990) who coded the decade-basis recognition of
pre-electoral coalition alternatives by using a 0, 0.5 to 1 scale, depending on the
level of identifiability. The original data is unavailable. Instead, I utilize data on
pre-electoral coalitions from Golder (2005). She identifies pre-electoral coalitions following
two indicators - the pre-electoral coalition must be officially announced and the parties
involved in the pre-electoral coalition cannot compete in the election as truly independent
parties (Golder 2005, 652). Again, these data are connected to the cabinets in ERD by
using the date of formation. And, dates that do not fit in the data from Golder (2005)
are recoded to fit with ERD data.
Polarization: Ideological polarization in the legislature is measured using the Esteban
and Ray polarization index (1994). Golder (2010) uses this index, but her replication data
ranges only up until 1998. Therefore, I coded the rest of the legislatures from 1999 and up
until today. The measure consist of data on policy distances and party seat shares. I used
the general left-right measure from the Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al. 2015) as
the baseline. In case of missing information on parties, I filled in with values from the
combined left-right expert survey measure in ParlGov, which combines data from multiple
sources3. I used the seat share data from the same data set. The data for the period I
needed came mainly from the expert survey of Benoit and Laver (2006). The formula for
calculating the polarization index is
Polarization =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Πα+1i Πj|yi − yj|, (3.1)
where i is a party in the legislature and j is a second party in the legislature. Π
is the seat share of party i and j. α is a fixed parameter, which is set at 1.3. The
maximum value for α is 1.6. I chose 1.3, following Indridason (2011, 715), who created
the polarization data used in Golder (2005). A higher α means increased sensitivity
to polarization (Indridason 2011, 694). Party i is compared to all the party j ’s in the
3The measure combines expert surveys from Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and Inglehart (1995),
Benoit and Laver (2006) and Bakker et al. (2015).
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legislature. Then the next party in the legislature becomes i, which again is compared to
the rest of the party j ’s in the legislature. Finally, the pairwise comparisons are summed
up to the legislative polarization index.
Continuation rule: This variable is used in the articles investigating bargaining
duration. It controls for the presence of a continuation rule. The continuation rule
states that the incumbent government always makes the first cabinet proposal for the
next bargaining round (Diermeier and van Roozendaal 1998, 620). Diermeier and van
Roozendaal identify the continuation rule to exist in Norway, Sweden and Denmark
(Diermeier and van Roozendaal 1998, 621). Sona Golder (2010, 30) uses the same coding
of the confounder, except that she also adds Great Britain to the list of countries having
the continuation rule. The variable is coded 1 for the countries identified to follow the
rule and zero otherwise.
Clerical-secular and regime support dimensions: To have comparable policy estimates
for parties ranging from 1945 to 2015 I found the manifesto coding from the Comparative
Manifesto Group (CMP) most beneficial (Volkens et al. 2014). The clerical-secular and
the regime support measure used in Warwick (1994) and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
comes mainly from Dodd (1976). Those data are not available. Therefore, I coded every
cabinet in my data set according to the absolute distance between the most extreme
cabinet parties. The cabinet parties were identified using information on cabinet party
composition in the ERD data set and then matched with party names in the CMP data.
Clericalism and secularism is coded according to the traditional morality category in
the manifesto data4. Regime support is covered by the anti versus pro constitution
dimension5.
Returnability: This indicator comes from Warwick (1994). He argues that there exists
an underlying probability of returning to power for each political system. This variable
is operationalized as the mean of the proportion of parties in the previous cabinet which
re-enter the following cabinet. Returnability is fixed for each political system. The
replication data set from Chiba et al. (2015) contains the proportion of parties which also
were present in the previous cabinet. This data was merged with the ERD data using
the formation date as merge key. There were some missing information. I calculated the
missing returnability values in the Chiba et al. (2015) data on the basis of the identification
4Category 603 and 604 in Volkens et al. (2014)
5Category 203 and 204 in Volkens et al. (2014)
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of cabinet parties in ERD. Firstly, I estimated a single probability for each country up
until 1990 (or 1998 in the case of Golder (2010)). Secondly, I re-estimated the probability
for the data from 1990 (1999) up until today using the full data set. This means that
the returnability score for the old data was calculated with the mean returnability from
1945 to 1989(1998) for each political system, while returnability for the new data was
calculated on the mean returnability from 1945 to 2015, for each political system.
Censoring government duration: I have relied on the most recently updated data on
the mode of termination. The date originates from the original Martin and Stevenson
(2001) data. This data was updated through 2012 for use in Chiba et al. (2015). Some
cabinets had missing values. I coded these cabinets manually, using information from
the election database in ParlGov (Holger and Manow 2012). Chiba et al. (2015) cites
Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) regarding their competing risk approach, and codes
cabinets in relation to if they ended in dissolution or replacement (Chiba et al. 2015,
52). The two modes are used separately for the competing risk approach, while the two
modes are pooled to make the censoring variable for the Warwick (1994) approach to
government duration.
All variables and data sources mentioned in this section are summarized in table 3.3
and 3.4, according to the two respective fields.
Table 3.3: Government Formation
Variable Source
Majority status ERD (2014)
Post-election ERD (2014)
Investiture ERD (2014)
Eff. number of parties ERD (2014)
Previous defeat PGD (2014)
Identifiability Golder (2005)
Polarization Golder (2010)
Caretaker ParlGov (2012)
Continuation Self-coded
Table 3.4: Government Duration
Variable Source
Majority status ERD (2014)
Post-election ERD (2014)
Investiture ERD (2014)
Ideological diversity ERD (2014)
Clerical-Secular diversity CMP (2014)
Regime support diversity CMP (2014)
Returnability Chiba (2015)
Censoring Chiba (2015)
3.2 Evaluating Predictive Power
3.2.1 In-sample prediction
One way of testing the quality of a model is to calculate the error rate between the
predicted and observed values of the dependent variable on the original sample. The
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empirical literature on government formation used in-sample predictions as a model
evaluation tool. Strøm (1990) shows that his model for explaining the presence of minority
governments predicts 70% of all formed minority governments in-sample. Another
example is Ba¨ck and Dumont (2007), who evaluate the in-sample predictive performance
of office- and policy seeking theories on the selection of the government coalition.
A weakness when doing in-sample predictions is that the estimated predictions are
based on the particular sample of data used to fit the model. The catch is that the
researcher can never know whether the estimates are just results of over-fitting or that
they describe real causal effects (Hill Jr. and Jones 2014, 662). Over-fitting means that
the estimated model is merely describing the data, or worse, only describing noises in
the data. The real interest is to catch real, underlying effects of a causal theory in the
available data.
A more specific point to the government formation and duration literature is that the
fields use data which are naturally restricted. There are only that many cabinets, no
matter how one chooses to count them. As a consequence, researchers using cabinets as
their units ”[...]have been picking over the entrails of essentially the same dataset” (Laver
2003, 27). One consequence of the restricted nature of cabinet data is that the probability
of over-fitting increases (Jones and Linder 2014, 21). Researches can not afford to hold
sets of data outside their analysis, and hence the models are fitted using all data available.
This does not present a problem with the analysis in itself, but it present a problem of
how to evaluate the ability of the model to describe real effects.
In all, the in-sample prediction method is an alternative way of evaluating a
model’s performance rather than looking only at the signs of coefficients and statistical
significance. However, because the method offer slim possibilities for knowing whether
the resulting predictions are results of underlying trends in the data or just noises, the
in-sample prediction method is not bulletproof. This weakness can be amended by
evaluating the performance of the model on a holdout data set, i.e. the out-of-sample
method.
3.2.2 Out-of-sample prediction
Out-of-sample prediction has to do with an estimation of a model on the original sample
and then measure the error rate between the predicted and observed values in a new
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data set. For example, Paul Warwick (1994), estimates government duration models
on observations from 1945-1989. My task of evaluating the theoretical approach from
Warwick is to gather data ranging from 1990 and up until today. The original model
will then be used to predict the duration in the new data, contingent on the values of
the predictors used. The errors between the actual and the predicted cabinet durations
are measured and used to calculate a unified error measure. This is the out-of-sample
prediction method of holding out a test set to validate the original model (James et al.
2013, 176). Testing the original model on a holdout data set, assumed to be based on
the same data generating process as the original sample, enables researches to put their
models up to a real test - is the model really able to predict unseen observations?
Scholars doing cross-national quantitative studies often want to infer something about
a general trend of the phenomenon in interest. Out-of-sample prediction is a way of testing
how a theoretical model is able to predict unseen events, and hence a very relevant tool
for evaluating theories and their generalizability. The method is illustrated in figure 3.1
below.
Full sample (1945-2015)
1945-1989 1990-2015
Out-of-sample approach
Figure 3.1: Illustration of out-of-sample validation approach. The full sample is split in two. One part
ranging from 1945 to 1989. 1990 to 2015 are held out and used to validate the original model using data
from the first part.
The predictive power of the old model estimated on new data will tell something about
how the model is capable of finding the real causal effects of the phenomenon in interest. A
model is expected to yield poorer predictions out-of-sample compared to in-sample. This
is because many statistical methods are attuned to minimizing the in-sample prediction
error (James et al. 2013, 32). Therefore, the consideration of traces of over-fitting in the
original model, as mentioned in section 1.4, does not automatically follow from poorer
out-of-sample predictions. The trends toward over-fitting must be judged independently
for each model, based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative judgements.
The out-of-sample method has two drawbacks. One is that the resulting error rate from
splitting data into two folds, as with the Warwick example above, is highly dependent
on where and how the split is applied to the data. The data in this thesis has been
clearly divided, one old data set from 1945 to 1989, 1998 for Golder (2010), and one new
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data set from 1990 (1999) and up until today. In effect, this means that the comparison
of predictions in- and out-of-sample is guided by time specific traits. The method will
therefore possibly yield variable results if a different split had been made, for example by
letting the computer randomly divide the data randomly 90% and a holdout set of the
remaining 10%.
The second drawback is that the model is fitted on the test data set, which has fewer
observations. Statistical methods do usually perform worse when applied to a limited set
of observations. This can lead to overestimated error rates (James et al. 2013, 178). One
solution to these two problematic areas of the out-of-sample approach is the k-fold cross
validation method.
3.2.3 K-fold cross validation
Instead of splitting the data into an original set and a holdout set, the k-fold cross
validation method randomly splits the observations into k equally large random folds.
To increase the randomness of the method, I estimate 100 models from each fold. The
mean results for each fold are used in the analyses chapters. The number of folds can
be as high as equal to the number of observations. However, when tested empirically,
the 5- or 10 fold cross validation analysis yields error rates that are neither highly biased
nor have high variance (James et al. 2013, 184). In this thesis the 5-fold cross validation
procedure is chosen. After choosing the amount of folds, the next step is to fit the model
on k-1 folds and use the fitted model to predict the data in the k fold, which is the fold
left out. This process is repeated k -times (James et al. 2013, 181). Figure 3.2 illustrates
the 5-fold cross validation method.
Original Data
Train Model Test Model
CV Fold 1
CV Fold 2
CV Fold 3
CV Fold 4
CV Fold 5
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the 5-fold cross validation approach. The 5 different figures separately
illustrate the full sample, while the 5 fold individually illustrates the 5 equally large folds the full sample
is split into.
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The final result is a mean error estimate calculated from errors between predictions
and observations in the five different folds. The benefits of the method is the minimal
dependency it puts on how the observations in the data is split. Hence, the resulting
predictive power is less reliant on time-specific traits in the data and more reliant on the
generalizability of the model to all parts of the sample.
3.2.4 Metric for measuring predictive power
To evaluate predictive power it is common to choose a metric that summarizes the deviance
between observations and predictions. I will use the root mean squared error (RMSE).
RMSE is often juxtaposed to mean absolute error, MAE. The real difference between the
measures is that RMSE penalizes larger deviances more than MAE (Chai and Draxler
2014, 1247). This makes RMSE the most conservative measure of the error rate and is
therefore chosen over MAE in the main analyses. The formal calculation of the RMSE is
as follows:
RMSE =
√√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − fˆ(xi))2 (3.2)
where y is the observed duration of either the bargaining or the government for
the individual cabinet i, whilst the estimated fˆ(x) is the predicted duration for the
corresponding cabinet i. The mean deviance between y and fˆ(x) is then squared to
get one measure of deviance between the predicted and observed outcomes. The model
with RMSE closest to zero has the comparatively best predictive power (James et al. 2013,
30). For interpretation, the value of the RMSE is dependent on the scale of the dependent
variable. Bargaining duration has a max value of 272, while government duration has 1956
days as maximum. The RMSE values are limited by these maximum values.
3.3 Statistical Model
All the original articles use a duration dependent variable. The property of duration
variables is that they measure the time from a start point to an end point, observed or
unobserved. Therefore, negative duration is impossible. Nor are the duration variables
normally distributed. Choosing an OLS-framework would hence give biased coefficients
and also the possibility of meaningless predictions. Additionally, in the government
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duration context, cabinets fall because of a constitutionally mandated election. Which
means that ”some observations may have left the sample before their termination mode
can be observed” (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 1059)6. The OLS-framework is not
adept to tackle these censored events. The solution is survival analysis.
One type of survival model is the Cox proportional hazard model. It has been used
by all four original articles used in this thesis. The benefits of using the Cox proportional
model compared to other approaches is the restricted amount of assumption one has to
make. Underlying a distribution of duration times is a failure probability. This is called
the baseline hazard. In parametric survival models one has to assume a distribution of
the failure times, i.e. if the risk of failure increases, decreases or is the same along the
duration period. The Cox model has the baseline hazard incorporated, but does not
explicitly model it. The drawback is that a substantial interpretation of the effects of
predictors require that the different levels of the predictors gives proportional hazards, or
have the same effect across the duration distribution. If the effect varies with time it will
be difficult to interpret the failure rate between the mean observations between groups of
observations.
Another drawback from using the Cox model is the implicit baseline hazard in the Cox
model. This implies that the model does not yield an intercept, and hence that making
predictions are somewhat unavailable. The benefit of using a parametric model over the
semi-parametric Cox model is that the parametrization of the baseline hazard makes it
possible to make substantially meaningful predictions.
To be able to use parametric models rather than the semi-parametric approach, both
approaches must be shown to give substantially the same conclusions. I have used the
Weibull parametrization of the baseline hazard. The Weibull model assumes that the
baseline hazard can both be increasing and decreasing over time (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004, 25). The comparisons is made in the tables in the appendix, where I show
both the Cox results from my data versus the Weibull results using my data. To show how
my data corresponds with the data used in the original articles, I will therefore use the
parametric Weibull model to show the estimated coefficients and the substantial effects.
As mentioned above, there are difficulties interpreting the substantial effects of a Cox
model. The accelerated failure time estimates from parametric models is more intuitive
6In the bargaining duration literature censoring is not an issue. There is always an end result, i.e. a
cabinet always forms, eventually.
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because the specification uses log of time as the response variable (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004, 26-27). It means that a negative coefficients is interpreted as decreasing
survival time, while a positive coefficient is interpreted as increasing survival. Therefore,
I will use the accelerated failure time specification of the Weibull model instead of the
proportional hazard rate given by the Cox model.
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CHAPTER 4
Predicting Government Formation
In this chapter I will assess the predictive power of the government formation duration
models presented in section 1.3. The first step will be to replicate the theoretically most
relevant results. This will serve to show that the data I have gathered are comparable to
the data used in the original articles. A weakness in the government formation literature
is the lack of illustrating the full range of substantial effects of the independent variables
(Golder et al. 2012a, 249). I will make up for this by showing the substantial effects of the
theoretically most interesting variables from the original models. The substantial effects
are calculated as predicted bargaining durations in a fixed context, where only the value
of the covariate in interest is varied.
Secondly, the in-sample predictive power of the original results will be calculated
and illustrated. The in-sample results are interpreted as an independent evaluation. In
addition the results are used as the baseline against which the out-of-sample and the cross
validation predictions will be compared regarding better or worse predictive power.
Thirdly, I will perform the out-of-sample analysis. Here, I will attempt to predict the
new data using the original models. The guiding question is to what extent the models
can generalize their claims to new cabinets formed after 1990, or after 1998 for Sona
Golder.
Finally, I will further validate the original models by using the 5-fold cross validation
method. This chapter ends with a summary of the results presented in this section. The
main message will be that both of the formation duration models evaluated experience a
drop in their predictive performance when faced with new data, compared to when tested
on the original sample.
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4.1 The Information Uncertainty Approach: Diermeier and van Roozendaal
(1998)
The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies by
Daniel Diermeier and Peter van Roozendaal (1998) was the first article to investigate
bargaining delays in parliamentary democracies by using a cross-national quantitative
analysis. In legislative studies, bargaining duration was used as a proxy for political crisis
- the longer the duration of the government formation process, the higher the level of crisis
in a political system (see for ex. Strøm (1990)). Diermeier and van Roozendaal saw this
gap and moved bargaining duration from the right to the left side of the equation. The
main concern in the article was to find evidence for the theoretical expectation that higher
levels of information uncertainty among the political actors involved in the bargaining lay
the ground for longer formation delays. The chosen indicators for information uncertainty
was post-election status and the mode of termination for the previous cabinet (Diermeier
and van Roozendaal 1998, 620).
4.1.1 Original results
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) uses bargaining formation level data from 13
Western European countries in the period between 1945 to 1989. This amounts to a
total of 304 individual formation processes. The authors use the Cox proportional hazard
model to estimate four different specifications. In this thesis, the reduced model, model
3, in Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998, 625) is chosen for evaluation. This model is
both the model which is singled out by the authors, and it is also the most parsimonious
model of the different specifications.
The replication of the original using my data, and using the Weibull model as discussed
in chapter 3, is presented in figure 4.11. Negative coefficients are interpreted as leading
to shorter survival, while a change in value in a positive coefficient is interpreted as
contributing to longer survival. The coefficients are quite close to the original effects,
except for the identifiability variable, the nature of which is discussed in section 3.1.3.
The substantial effects of the information uncertainty indicators are identical.
1The comparison between Cox and Weibull, as well as the original results, are shown in table A.1 in
the appendix.
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Log(scale)
Intercept
Identifiability
Continuation
Caretaker
Previous Defeat
Post−Election
−3.0 −2.5 −2.0 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Accelerated failure time
Figure 4.1: Coefficient plot showing the coefficients from the replication of model 3, Diermeier and
Roozendaal (1998, 625). The dashed line represents zero effect.
The differences can be due to the loss of observations from using the identifiability
and the previous defeat variables. The full sample from my data, using countries and
periods as described in Diermeier and Stevenson (1998, 619), consists of 318 cabinets.
The identifiability variable drops 35 of them, whilst the previous defeat variable drops
23 observations. Combined, the two indicators drop 48 observations, leaving the total
original sample to 270 non-missing observations. Additionally, differences can also be
traced by how they have counted cabinets. However, the authors do not specify their
sample, and it is therefore possible that there exists some definitional differences between
how the cabinets are counted in ERD and in the data used in the original article. I move
on by showing the substantial effects.
Formation bargaining in a post-election context yields longer bargaining duration than
formation bargaining in an inter-election context. A formation bargaining preceded by a
parliamentary defeat have longer formation delays than a formation bargaining where
there were other reasons for cabinet termination. These two findings are replicated
in the data I have collected. This gives support to the main argument in Diermeier
and van Roozendaal (1998) that more uncertainty leads to longer bargaining situations.
Additionally, by making the replication as close as shown in table A.1 in the appendix,
the reliability of the findings in the article is strengthened.
The effects of the theoretically most important predictors are illustrated in figure
4.2. It shows the predicted bargaining duration on the two levels of the two uncertainty
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indicators. Post-election context, coded as 1, increases government formation duration by
around 25 days [13-42]2, compared to an inter-election context, coded 0. The difference
between the effect of inter-election and post-election context is highly significant.
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Figure 4.2: Predicted bargaining duration from different values of the uncertainty indicators from
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998).
A bargaining context with a previous defeat gives predicted point estimates indicating
an increase in bargaining duration. However, the effects are not statistically separable,
as indicated by the crossing confidence intervals in the right panel of figure 4.2. The
substantial effects have been shown to be identical with the original results.
The predictive ability of the bargaining duration model by Diermeier and van
Roozendaal (1998) is estimated without the identifiability variable. Firstly, the
identifiability variable I have used introduces a substantial amount of missing values
in the data ranging from 1989 up until today. Secondly, there is some confusion as to
how the original identifiability variable has been coded, and hence, there is also some
confusion of what the variable actually measure. The data comes from Strøm (1990),
which codes the identifiability of pre-electoral coalition alternatives ”impressionistically as
low(0), medium(.5) and high(1) on a decade-to-decade basis” (1990, 73). It would be hard
to code the new data following this guidance. Table A.1 in the appendix shows exactly
how the effect of the indicator varies. When the pre-electoral agreement variable is used,
the effect goes from being a small positive coefficient to a small negative coefficient. After
checking the importance of the identifiability predictor, both in terms of estimates and
in-sample predictive ability, I find that the differences are minimal. Hence, identifiability
is excluded from the evaluation of the predictive power of the uncertainty approach.
2Highest and lowest estimate.
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The next step is now to test how well the information uncertainty model predicts the
duration of the original sample.
4.1.2 In-sample prediction
Figure 4.3 shows the density of the observed and predicted values from the in-sample
evaluation of the reduced model in Diermeier and van Roozendaal.
One trend is evident. The predicted values are mainly represented by three spikes.
The largest spike comes at around 10 days. This corresponds to the largest density for
the observed values. This is positive - the model is able to predict the largest amount
of observed duration. However, the density areal is smaller for the observed than the
predicted duration. The second largest bulks up around 40 days, and the smallest spike
comes after around 65 days of bargaining.
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Figure 4.3: In-sample predictive accuracy from the reduced model in Diermeier and van Roozendaal
(1998, 625). The y-axis indicates the kernel density. Kernel density is an improved alternative to
histograms for illustrating the distribution of continuous variables. The x-axis shows bargaining duration
in days.
The main trends are over-estimation of the minimum values, over-predicting mean
values and not predicting durations longer than 70 days. This is further shown by the
RMSE of 32.5 days average prediction error, weighted on individual deviances between
prediction and observation. A statistical explanation for the spike-trend and the high
RMSE can be found in the binary nature of the predictors used by Diermeier and van
Roozendaal (1998) to explain variation in bargaining days. Every predictor is a dummy,
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as shown in table 4.1. Hence there is a limit as to the range of values the model can
predict. The binary nature of the model prohibits the predictions to follow the more
natural distribution of the observations, and the consequence is large deviances. These
large deviances, then, lead to the inflated RMSE score discussed above.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics - Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Variable No Yes
Post-election 144 151
Previous Defeat 239 56
Caretaker 277 18
Continuation 231 64
N 295
Therefore, the in-sample predictions show evidence of a model not able to follow a
natural distribution due to the binary nature of the predictors chosen. This trend is
likely to be shown in the next section. However, will the model be able to show signs
of generalizability to the new data? The next step will be to evaluate the information
uncertainty model out-of-sample.
4.1.3 Out-of-sample prediction
The in-sample evidence pointed to poor predictive ability of the information uncertainty
approach. Figure 4.4 shows how the model performs out-of-sample. The figure is based
on predictive accuracy on 96 western European cabinets from 1999 to 2015. The trends
described in the previous section are nearly replicated when the model is tested on new
cabinets. However, in figure 4.4, there are two spikes, compared to the three spikes that
was shown for the in-sample predictions. As opposed to the in-sample evidence, the
largest predicted density does not correspond with the largest observed density.
It is fair to say that the ability of the Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) model
to predict new data is worse than the ability to predict the in-sample observations.
However, the difference between the RMSE values indicates that the in- and out-of-sample
differences should not be exaggerated. In-sample predictions miss by 32.5 days whilst the
model misses by 36.5 days out-of sample, on average, and where the RMSE is weighted by
large deviances. Given that the target is zero, both the in- and out-of-sample predictions
miss significantly, but the differences between the two are not that large.
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Figure 4.4: Out-of-sample predictive accuracy, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998). The density plot
is based on observed and predicted values from the test set.
Summed up, the information uncertainty model has explanatory power on data
ranging up until 1990, but it does not show an impressive ability of predicting the same
observations. The trend continues out-of-sample with an increase in RMSE relative to
the in-sample RMSE. An explanation is that the model has pushed modeling simplicity
too far to be able to pick up the real underlying trends in the data.
As mentioned in chapter 3, the out-of-sample method utilizing only a training set and
a test set is highly sensitive to how the data is split. Since the split has been chosen from
a possible confounder, time, it makes sense to further evaluate how the model performs
when the full sample is split to 5 random folds. The next step uses the 5-fold cross
validation to search for a more broad answer to the generalizability of the model.
4.1.4 Cross validation
Having established that there exist a difference in predictive power in-sample and
out-of-sample, the last step is an evaluation of the generalizability of the Diermeier and
van Roozendaal model which is less dependent on time, and hence, more concerned with
how well the model picks up what it tries to model. Figure 4.5 presents the results of
the cross validation analysis. The first thing to note is that the RMSE value for the
5-fold cross validation analysis is closer to the RMSE value in-sample than the RMSE
out-of-sample. This indicates that the model predicts better when re-fitted on random
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samples than when the data is split to before and after 1990.
RMSE = 33.5
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Bargaining Duration
Ke
rn
e
l D
en
si
ty
Predicted
Observed
Figure 4.5: Predictive accuracy from 5-fold cross validation, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998).
The density plot is based on observed and predicted values from splitting and predicting on 5 different
folds of the full data set.
A second point is that the density plot shows an almost identical distribution of
predicted bargaining durations compared to the in-sample results. This gives another
indication that the predictive power of the model is reduced out-of-sample, but when all
observations are randomly folded and predicted, the results indicate the same trend as
the in-sample predictions. This also means that over-fitting is not a prominent problem
of the model when tested on random samples. The results are not only dependent on the
original sample when the cross validation RMSE is close to the in-sample predictions 3.
This concludes the evaluation of the more parsimonious approach of modeling one
aspect of the government formation process. Next follows the more complex approach,
represented by Golder (2010).
4.2 The Combined Uncertainty and Complexity Approach: Golder (2010)
Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process by Sona Golder (2010) is a
unification of two competing theoretical explanations of the observed deviance from the
Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model (1989). Following the argument in Golder (2010),
3There are some variance in the RMSE for the 5 different folds, meaning that some folds can consist
of harder predicted observations than other folds. Hence, folds with harder observations will also have
higher RMSE. The RMSE given here is the mean of the 5 different RMSE’s. The five different RMSE
measures are shown in figure A.1 in the appendix.
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the two approaches should be empirically validated by intertwining the theories. The
information uncertainty and the bargaining complexity approaches have been thoroughly
covered in chapter 2. The argument in Golder (2010) is that both approaches are
valuable. However, the effect of complexity is contingent on the degree of information
uncertainty among actors involved in the government formation bargaining. This means
that bargaining complexity only have an effect on bargaining duration when the actors
involved in the bargaining are uncertain about the preferences and strategies of the other
actors. Therefore, the main empirical, and theoretical, focus for Golder (2010) is to
interact the information uncertainty indicator, post-election status, with the bargaining
complexity indicators, such as the effective number of parties, the ideological polarization
in the legislature and the presence or absence of the investiture rule.
4.2.1 Original results
Sona Golder (2010) uses data from 16 Western European countries from 1944 to
1998. This gives a total of 383 observations of government formation bargaining. The
dependent variable is bargaining duration, measured in days between the date of previous
government’s termination and the date when the new government is invested. I have
replicated model 4 from table 2 in Golder (2010, 20-21). This model is the only one which
incorporates the contingent theoretical account, interacting the uncertainty variables with
complexity indicators.
Log(scale)
Intercept
Post−Election*Polarization
Post−Election*Legislative parties
Post−Election*Investiture
Continuation
Single party majority
Investiture
Legislative parties
Polarization
Post−Election
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Accelerated failure time
Figure 4.6: Coefficient plot showing the coefficients from Golder (2010). The dashed line indicates no
effect.
The replication is shown in figure 4.6. The results illustrated are accelerated failure
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time estimates from the Weibull model, estimated on the original sample. As in the
previous section, negative estimates yield shorter survival times and positive estimates
indicate longer survival. The replicated results are almost identical to the results in
Golder (2010, 20-21)4. The effects in figure 4.6 are almost impossible to interpret from
the coefficients alone, due to the three interaction terms included in the model. This
means that an insignificant coefficient in figure 4.6, i.e. a effect with confidence intervals
crossing zero, does not necessarily imply no explanation power. It only means that the
effects are dependent on the value of the other predictors in the model.
Figure 4.7 shows the effects of the variables that are interacted in the combined model.
The effects of the uncertainty indicator, post-election status, and the three bargaining
complexity indicators are illustrated. The substantial effects are illustrated by using
predicted bargaining duration, calculated by holding the remaining dummy variables at
their zero value and the continuous predictors at their mean.
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Figure 4.7: Illustrating the theoretically most interesting interaction effects from Golder (2010). All
y-axes indicates predicted bargaining duration, measured in days.
The influence of positive parliamentarism is shown in the left panel of figure 4.7.
This replicates the finding from Golder (2010, 23). Having the investiture rule does
actually reduce the predicted length of bargaining. That is, countries practising positive
4See table A.4 in the appendix for the comparison between the Cox and Weibull models, as well as
the comparison between the original results and the replication using my data.
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parliamentarism are estimated to reduce the length of their formation duration. However,
the effects are not statistically different across the two levels of uncertainty. Even though
having positive parliamentarism is theoretically expected to increase complexity, and
hence bargaining duration, Golder points out that only in minority situations are the
effect realistic (2010, 24).
A post-election context interacted with higher levels of polarization in the legislature
yields significant differences in predicted bargaining duration. And, as argued in Golder
(2010, 15), inter-election periods have constant or decreasing effect. This is in line with
the estimated effects of ideological polarization, shown in the top figure in the right panel
of figure 4.7.
The same significant difference is found when post-election context is interacted with
the number of effective parties in the legislature. The more parties in the legislature
the longer the predicted bargaining duration. For inter-election contexts, the effect
of the effective number of parties is basically constant. This indicates that effective
number of parties has significantly different effects depending on the degree of information
uncertainty.
I have shown that the substantial results using my data are the same as the findings in
Golder (2010). The next step of the evaluation is in-sample predictions, where the model
as a whole is tested for how well it predicts bargaining duration.
4.2.2 In-sample prediction
The in-sample predictions plotted in figure 4.8 show a model which is comparatively better
at predicting bargaining duration than the pure uncertainty approach shown in section
4.1. Similarly to the in-sample evidence from the information uncertainty model, the
highest density of predicted bargaining durations comes at around 15 days. While the
in-sample predictions from the information uncertainty model bulked up to two and three
spikes, the in-sample predictions for the combined approach follow the distribution of the
observed duration more closely. In addition, the combined approach is able to predict the
largest bulk of durations. The largest deviance comes around 40 days, where the observed
distribution monotonically decreases while the predictions shows a sudden increase.
Another indicator of better predictive ability in-sample is that the RMSE of 9
days indicates a decrease in average error relative to the in-sample evidence from the
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RMSE = 23.5
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Figure 4.8: In-sample predictive accuracy, for the combined model in Golder (2010, 20-21). The x-axis
gives bargaining duration in days.
information uncertainty approach. This means that the combined model is a better model
to the original sample than the uncertainty model, measured by in-sample predictive
power.
4.2.3 Out-of-sample prediction
The in-sample evidence indicated that the model could be able to both predict and
explain. The out-of-sample evidence shown in figure 4.9 is made from the predictions and
observations of 70 Western European cabinets from 1999 to 2015. The figure illustrates
a model less adapted to predict new cabinets compared to how well it predicted the
observations in-sample. Here, the model predicts the highest density to be around 25
days, while the highest observed density comes at around 10 days.
However, the model is still able to follow the observed durations from 45 days and
onward. This clearly separates the combined approach from the uncertainty approach,
which only predicted durations up to around 50 bargaining days. The out-of-sample
predictions show a small bump at 140 days, which indicates that the combined model is
better able to follow the bargaining duration distribution.
Still, the out-of-sample evidence shows a model yielding predictions worse than the
in-sample evidence. The RMSE of 38 days mean deviance as compared to the in-sample
RMSE of 23.5 days, illustrate the poorer ability of the combined model to predict new
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RMSE = 38
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Figure 4.9: Out-of-sample predictive accuracy, Golder (2010). The density plot is based on observed
and predicted values from the test set.
observations. One reason for the increase in RMSE by 14.5 days out-of-sample is the
choice of RMSE as metric for evaluating predictive power. The metric punishes large
deviances comparatively harder than other measures of prediction error. In effect, this
means that the out-of-sample evidence from the combined approach consists of larger
individual errors than in the information uncertainty approach.
4.2.4 Cross validation
After splitting the data to 5 folds and predicting the outcome in the left-out fold, the
RMSE shows a decrease from 38 days out-of-sample to around 25.5 days. The trend equals
that of the uncertainty approach from Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) - higher
RMSE out-of-sample than in-sample, while cross validation yields a RMSE comparatively
closer to the in-sample predictions.
The main interpretation of this section is that when the prediction error rate is
tested by randomly dividing the observations into 5 folds, the results show similarities
to the in-sample results. Hence, the combined information uncertainty and bargaining
complexity model is better adapted to explain general trends in the data compared to
testing the model on specific time periods5.
5Similarly as in the information uncertainty approach, the RMSE varies between the 5 folds. The
RMSE’s are shown in figure A.1 in appendix A.
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Figure 4.10: Predictive accuracy from 5-fold cross validation, Golder (2010). The density plot is based
on observed and predicted values from splitting and predicting on 5 different folds of the full data set.
Therefore, as with the information uncertainty approach, the cross validation of the
combined model does rather well when compared to the in-sample approach and measured
with RMSE. Because the model is able to generalize as well on a random sample as to
the original sample, this evidence demonstrate that the combined model show fewer sings
of being over-fitted to the original sample.
4.3 Summarizing Predictive Power in Government Formation
In concluding this chapter it would firstly seem evident that the theoretically, and
empirically, most complex approach to the prediction of bargaining duration gives the best
predictive power. The combined approach from Golder (2010) predicts best in-sample.
The out-of-sample evidence shows that the information uncertainty approach has the
lowest RMSE of 37.5 as compared to 38.5 for the combined model. However, the graphical
illustration shows that the combined approach is better able to predict a more natural
distribution of bargaining duration than the uncertainty approach which consisted of large
bulks.
Secondly, both models perform worse out-of-sample than in-sample. This means that
none of the models fitted on data from 1945 to 1989 generalizes well to new data. This
indicates that the empirical models might be over-fitted. However, this is nuanced by
the cross validations. These results are close to the in-sample predictions. This can be
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interpreted as an ability of the model to generalize its results not only to the specific
original sample but also when tested on random folds.
Thirdly, the substantially relevant results of the original articles have been replicated.
Information uncertainty has a significant impact on bargaining duration, but the combined
approach which incorporates the information uncertainty approach, has also done so. This
means that the information uncertainty approach might suffer from omitted variable bias.
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CHAPTER 5
Predicting Government Duration
In this chapter, I will evaluate the predictive performance of two government duration
models, Warwick (1994) and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). I will apply the identical
procedure as in the previous chapter - firstly, showing how the theoretically most
important substantial effects, using my data, are similar to the corresponding effects from
the original results. Secondly, estimate the in-sample predictive performance. Thirdly,
calculating prediction error for the original model out-of-sample, using the data from 1990
to 2015. And, finally, applying the cross validation method to the full sample.
5.1 The Importance of Ideology: Warwick (1994)
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies by Paul Warwick (1994) introduced
ideological indicators to the study of government duration. The main theoretical argument
was that increased level of policy disagreement within the cabinet would causally correlate
with lower government duration. The rationale is simple - the bigger the distances on
policy-dimensions between cabinet parties lead to more conflict, and higher levels of
conflict is a mechanism which contributes to earlier termination.
5.1.1 Original results
Warwick (1994) uses data from 15 Western European countries in the period between
1945 to 1989. The original data set consist of 374 cabinets. However, Warwick lacks
ideological data on Finland, Spain, Portugal and Iceland (1994, 55). These countries
are therefore dropped in the analysis, resulting in 284 non-missing observations1. The
1I have done the same with my data. The drawback is reducing observations in the new data. However,
it makes the results more comparable to the original empirical model.
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dependent variable is the duration in days between the date of formation and the date of
termination. Cabinets are censored in situations of a constitutionally mandated election,
technical failures such as the death of a prime minister or cabinets that have yet to
experience termination2. Warwick (1994), because of the nature of the dependent variable,
applies the Cox proportional hazard model. I will evaluate model 7 (Warwick 1994,
59) because it includes three ideological indicators, which are found to have the most
explanatory power. The model estimated using my data is shown in figure 5.1. The
coefficients are accelerated failure time estimates from the Weibull specification3.
Log(scale)
Regime Support Diversity
Clerical−Secular Diversity
Left−Right Diversity
Returnability
Investiture
Post−Election
Majority Cabinet
−1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Accelerated failure time
Figure 5.1: Intercept: 6.53[6.10-6.96]. Coefficients from original article, Warwick (1994). The dashed
line represents no effect.
A note to the replication of the original results is the remarkable uncertainty estimates
for the returnability variable. As explained in the data section, chapter 3, I have calculated
this measure using data from Chiba et al. (2015). One possible explanation is that
returnability is a variable which have been calculated in different ways. Hence, it is
hard to find out how the original variable is coded, and therefore the replication is made
harder.
The main theoretical point in Warwick (1994) is the importance of the policy-seeking
assumption for the explanation of government duration. In figure 5.2 I show how the
2For Warwick (1994) this was the cabinets that had not terminated as of 1989. For my data, cabinets
are censored if the have not been terminated by May 2015.
3The comparisons between Cox and Weibull, as well as the comparison between the original and the
replication, are shown in table B.1 in the appendix.
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ideological indicators affect the predicted government duration. The only statistically
significant ideological predictor is that higher degrees of diversity on the regime support
dimension decreases the duration of cabinets, which is consistent with the argument
in Warwick (1994). As seen in the left panel, changes in the regime support variables
leads to significant decreases in predicted government duration. However, the right panel
illustrates the zero-effects both from the left-right diversity and clerical-secular predictors.
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Figure 5.2: Effect of ideological indicators on predicted government duration, Warwick (1994). Y-axes
indicate predicted government duration, in days.
Warwick (1994, 57) reports a small positive proportional hazard estimate of both the
left-right and the clerical-secular dimension. This indicates that higher levels of left-right
diversity lead to shorter expected government survival. The results in figure 5.1 show
that the left-right dimension has as close to zero-effect as possible. The same goes for
the clerical-secular dimension. In Warwick (1994, 57), the effect of the clerical-secular
dimension is positive, indicating decreasing survival for cabinets with higher levels of
clerical-secular diversity.
One possible explanation of this finding is that I have coded the clerical-secular and
regime-support indicators with CMP data (Volkens et al. 2014). Warwick’s ideological
data comes from several expert surveys and using scales from Dodd (1976). The left-right
cabinet ideological diversity measure from the ERD data comes also from CMP. This
measure has been shown in other studies as well to give the same zero effect for the
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general left-right measure - in Chiba et. al. (2015, 54) and in Saalfeld (2008, 340)
regarding government duration, and De Winter and Dumont (2008, 149-150) regarding
bargaining duration.
A second explanation can be that the regime support dimension steal effect from in
particular the left-right measure. The general left-right measure is supposed to inhibit
different sub-dimensions. When regime support is the strongest predictor, one explanation
could be that ideology only has effect on a sub-dimensional level. Another explanation is
that regime support takes effect from the general measure. However, when I exclude
the regime support predictor, the result stays the same - no effect from the general
left-right ideological, and the effect of the clerical-secular dimension is constant. It is
clear, therefore, that the effect of the left-right and clerical-secular dimensions found in
Warwick (1994) is not replicable when using manifesto data.
5.1.2 In-sample prediction
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Figure 5.3: In-sample predictive accuracy from model 7 in Warwick (1994, 59). The x-axis represents
government duration measured in days.
The in-sample predictions in figure 5.3 show that the ideological model delays the
predicted peak of terminations to 500 days, whereas the observed durations peak around
200 days. The observed risk of termination increases as the number of days increases from
around 1200 days. The model predicts the same slight bump at around 1400 days. These
two observations indicate that the ideological model is able to roughly follow the main
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trends in the observed cabinet duration data.
However, between 400 and 900 days the prediction errors are quite substantial. This
is also shown in the RMSE of 419, which means that on average the ideological approach
misses the observed durations by 419 days, weighted by large individual deviances. In
effect, the predictions are one year and almost three months off, on average, for each
cabinet in the data from 1945 to 1989. In all, the Warwick model does not predict
cabinet duration very well in-sample. This gives support to the claim that explanation
power does not need to mean predictive power. The next step is to test the predictive
performance of the original model on new data.
5.1.3 Out-of-sample prediction
The out-of-sample evaluation is performed on 92 cabinets from 1990 to 2015. Summed
up, the ideology approach does not generalize well to the new sample. Figure 5.4 shows
mean deviance between observed and predicted observation of 507 days, which is an 83
day increase from the performance in-sample.
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Figure 5.4: Out-of-sample predictive accuracy, Warwick (1994).
The majority of the predictions are concentrated between 400 and 1200 days with
a peak after 800 days, whereas the distribution of the observed duration peaks at 1400
days. A noticeable change from the in-sample results is the distribution of the actual
duration days in the data from 1990 and up until today. It shows that cabinets formed
after 1990 last longer, compared to cabinets formed before 1990. This change represents
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a possible explanation for the poor out-of-sample predictive power. Because of changes in
government duration before and after 1990, the ideological model predict cabinets more
poorly out-of-sample.
This section has shown that when the model is applied on data from 1990 and onwards
it shows decreased predictive power compared to the in-sample predictions. This can be
a sign of over-fitting, because the model is more adept at predicting the original sample
compared to the new sample. If different splits are applied to the data, will it then show
better predictive performance?
5.1.4 Cross validation
The density plot in figure 5.5 shows a model less able of predicting low government
durations. However, the predictions follow roughly the same patterns as the in-sample
results. First, the prediction density shows slight over-predictions around the middle of
the distribution. Second, the density peaks at the beginning of the distribution for both
observed and predicted durations. However, for the predictions, the peak is delayed by
around 400 days compared to the observations.
RMSE = 491
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
0.0014
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Government Duration
Ke
rn
e
l D
en
si
ty Predicted
Observed
Figure 5.5: Predictive accuracy from 5-fold cross validation, Warwick (1994). The density plot is based
on observed and predicted values from splitting and predicting on 5 different folds of the full data set.
Interpreted, the cross validation shows signs of an original model which is dependent
on the original sample to be able to predict government duration. When the cabinets
are split randomly into 5 folds, the RMSE is lower than for the out-of-sample approach,
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but higher than the in-sample approach. Combined, this means that the model is not as
generalizable to samples other than the original4.
5.2 Strategic Dissolution: Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Cabinet Survival and Competing Risk from Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) introduces the
strategic assumption of government actors in the modeling of government duration. Their
main point is that earlier approaches, Warwick (1994) and King et al. (1990) among others,
assumes that government actors does not possess the ability making of strategic decisions.
After showing formally that a member of the government can benefit from leaving the
cabinet, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) demonstrate empirically that there exist two
ways for a government to terminate - one in dissolution and one in replacement. This
differs from previous attempts that have been pooling different modes of terminations,
as in Warwick (1994). Pooling terminations can therefore be a potential source of biased
results.
5.2.1 Original results
The Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) data set covers 15 western European countries as
well as Canada and Israel5. Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) uses the ideological data
from Warwick (1994), mentioned in the previous section. Therefore, the same countries
are dropped from their analysis - that is, Finland, Iceland, Spain and Portugal.
The replication of the original results is presented in figure 5.6 6. The results point to
a close to zero effect on the general left-right measure, both for the dissolution and the
replacement models. The clerical-secular diversity indicator shows a negative coefficient
in the replacement model, meaning that increased clerical-secular diversity predicts a
decrease in government duration. This effect is the opposite in the original model.
This can be explained by differences in the sample. Or, as mentioned in the Warwick
(1994) evaluation, it can be because my ideological data stems from party manifesto data,
4There are some variance in the RMSE for the 5 different folds, depending on if the folds have more
or less predictable observations. The RMSE given here is the mean of the 5 different RMSE’s. The five
different RMSE measures are shown in figure B.1 in appendix B.
5Canada and France, 4th republic, are not included in the ERD data set. I have collected data for
both countries. I have not found appropriate data for Israel, and Israel is therefore excluded from the
analysis.
6The comparison between Cox and Weibull and the comparison between the original results and my
replication are shown in table B.4 in the appendix.
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Log(scale)
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Figure 5.6: Intercept Dissolution: 6.19[5.44-6.94]. Intercept Replacement: 7.50[6.86-8.14]. Coefficient
plot from the competing risk approach, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). The dashed line equals no effect.
while the original data are coded from different expert surveys. Again, the returnability
indicator shows unstable and unreliable results. This was shown in the Warwick model
and is still the case for the competing risk approach. The inference one can draw is that
the effect of returnability is highly sensitive to calculation and coding.
Figure 5.7 shows the effect of the full range of left-right diversity for both modes of
termination. The predicted government durations are calculated holding dummy variables
at their zero value and the continuous predictors at their mean, while the value of the
left-right diversity indicator is allowed to vary. The main message here is the uncertainty in
the results. The estimates show a cabinet diversity indicator which decreases and increases
the number of predicted government duration days, respectfully for the dissolution and
replacement model. However, the effects cannot be trusted on conventional levels of
significance.
A potential source of error, which can explain the somewhat different results when
using my data, is the coding of dissolution and replacement terminations. Diermeier
and Stevenson (1999) used an automatic coding procedure for how the cabinet ended.
They calculated the remaing time until the constitutionally mandated election for each
cabinet, and recorded a dissolution if an election happened before the period had ended.
Replacements were coded for cabinets which did not directly follow an election. Technical
failures, cabinets lasting until 6 month before an end to the constitutionally mandated,
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Figure 5.7: Predicted effect of Left-Right cabinet ideological diversity, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999).
Predicted government duration is measured in days.
and cabinets which had not experienced termination within 1989 were all censored7.
As mentioned in section 3.1, I have used a newly updated data set from Chiba et al.
(2015), which explicitly used dissolution and replacement censoring in the study of
government duration. Diermeier and Stevenson (1999, 1063) reports 124 dissolutions and
117 replacements, out of 268 observations between 1945 to 1989. Chiba et al. (2015, 52)
reports 112 dissolutions and 231 replacements out of a total 432 cabinets from 1945-2012.
This means that over half the observations are coded as replacements while only a quarter
are dissolutions as opposed to Diermeier and Stevenson where number of dissolutions and
replacements are nearly identical.
5.2.2 In-sample prediction
The in-sample predictions in figure 5.8 show a clear weakness in predicting cabinet
durations of cabinets ending in dissolution. The RMSE-value indicates that on average,
the in-sample predictions miss the observed durations by 1202 days. It also shows that the
dissolution model predicts almost up to 3500 days government duration. The predictive
power is improved when using the replacement terminations as the event in question. The
7Information on termination and censoring coding retrieved from e-mail correspondence with Randolph
Stevenson.
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RMSE is more than halved from the dissolution approach, and as shown in figure 5.8, the
model has fewer predictions ranging outside the observed duration distribution compared
to the dissolution model.
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Figure 5.8: In-sample predictive accuracy of governments ending in dissolution and replacements,
Diermeier and Stevenson (1999).
A statistical explanation for the poor performance of the dissolution model is that there
are only 79 non-missing observations which were dissolution terminations. The remaining
observations are censored, and therefore do only contribute to the survival function. This
leads to a high intercept which over-estimate the survival rate, which again makes the
model unable to predict any observations under the value of the intercept 8. When the
largest bulk of the observed durations are under 500, this means that the model has
explanatory power, but not much predictive power, especially for low durations.
The replacement model is somewhat better compared to the dissolution model. This
could be explained statistically by the fact that there are 132 observations replacement
terminations. The number of observations that contribute information to the failure rate
is over half of the total number (259), and this makes the model better able to predict
lower durations, because fewer observations are censored. Still, compared to the Warwick
(1994) approach in-sample, the RMSE is 263 days higher. Since both Warwick (1994)
and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) use effectively the same sample, the differences must
be traced mostly to competing risk framework and the restricted empirics which restrains
8For the dissolution model, the intercept is at exp(6.19)= 488 days.
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the empirical evaluation of the approach.
5.2.3 Out-of-sample prediction
The results in this section are based on predicted and observed values of 102 cabinets
from 1990 until today. The expectations formed from testing the competing risk approach
in-sample are more or less continued when tested on the new data. The out-of-sample
evidence in figure 5.9 shows that both models, but especially the dissolution model, are
incapable of predicting cabinet duration. Dissolution predictions miss by 1213 days on
average, making it even worse than the in-sample dissolution predictions.
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Figure 5.9: Out-of-sample predictive accuracy of governments ending in dissolution and replacements,
Diermeier and Stevenson (1999).
The replacement model tells a different story. The RMSE has decreased by 109 days
compared to the in-sample results. The data, hence, shows that the replacement model
is better adept to predict cabinets from 1990 up until today rather than predicting the
durations in the original sample. Given that the new data have a higher mean cabinet
duration and that the high intercept leads to predictions biased towards finding high
observed durations, a tentative explanation could be that the replacement model has
higher probability to predict higher durations than shorter durations.
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5.2.4 Cross validation
The 5-fold cross validation gives the worst RMSE’s, both for the dissolution and the
replacement termination models. Here, the full dataset consisting of 363 observations,
is split randomly to 5 folds. The main interpretation of figure 5.10 follows in line with
the in-sample and out-of-sample results - both models are incapable of predicting actual
government durations, and the dissolution model is the worst. The cross validation
evidence helps illustrate the general inability of the competing risk approach to predict
the government duration.
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Figure 5.10: Predictive accuracy from 5-fold cross validation, governments ending in dissolution and
replacements, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999).
One nuance is due. While the dissolution model is fairly stable across the evaluations,
the replacement model show some signs of a better ability of predicting duration. However,
when the replacement model is evaluated using 5-fold cross validation the RMSE is the
worst compared to in- and out-of-sample. This can indicate over-fitting of the in-sample
results. When the Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) competing risk approach is not
estimated on the original sample, but rather on a random sample from the full sample,
the results show that the competing risk approach has low generalizability9.
9There is also some variance in the RMSE for the 5 different folds. The RMSE for the 5 folds are
shown in figure B.1 in appendix B.
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5.3 Summarizing Predictive Power in Government Duration
Firstly, this chapter has shown how the more parsimonious approach from Warwick
(1994) yields far better predictive power compared to the more complex approach of
Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). However, it must be stressed that none of the models
are particularly good at predicting government duration. This means that the significant
explanatory effects, shown in sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1, do not contribute much predictive
power, either for the original cabinets, the new cabinets or the random split sample.
This weakness can be checked and tested on other government duration models, and it
is possible that there exist government duration models which predicts better than the
models I have chosen for this thesis. Nevertheless, the evidence shown in this chapter
points to the usage of more parsimonious models when dealing with the subject of
government duration.
Secondly, the out-of-sample evidence show conflicting stories. On one side, the
ideological approach and the dissolution model have decreased predictive power on new
observations. On the other side, however, the replacement model shows a decreased
out-of-sample RMSE compared to the in-sample RMSE. This can be explained by the
observed increase in government duration in general after 1990. Tentatively, this has
been explained by the high intercept in the replacement model, which leads to high
predictions. This coincides with the descriptive fact that mean government duration has
increased after 1990.
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CHAPTER 6
Evaluation Robustness
This chapter aims to broaden the scope of the evaluations. In chapters 4 and 5 I have
evaluated government formation and duration models using tough criteria. Firstly, I have
measured predictive power of how the models were able to predict days, and not how
they predicted the right amount of weeks or even months. The logic here is that a larger
target is easier to hit than a smaller target. Secondly, it has been the expected that the
models was able to predict the full scope of both the bargaining and government duration
distributions. A more relaxed demand would be to analyze predictive power of models
regarding how they for example predicted median observations. Theories aim, broadly
speaking, at predicting the general cases. Hence, one would expect a decent model to at
least manage to predict median observations.
Therefore, this chapter has the following two parts. Firstly, I will group the in- and
out-of-sample predictions to three levels of the duration distribution. Additionally, this
section will also group the three levels further into the individual countries. This makes it
possible to evaluate how easy or hard to predict the individual countries are. And also the
potential consequences this has for the conclusions from the main evaluations. Secondly,
as a consequence of the results in the first section, I will use an alternative measure for
prediction error which weights large errors less.
6.1 Nuancing Prediction Errors
In this section I will show how the models are able to predict cabinets in the different
countries on different levels of duration. I will go through the models, one by one, and
show their nuanced in- and out-of-sample predictions. I will group the observations to
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the 25th quantile, the median and the 75th quantile of the duration distribution. These
durations will be compared to the ability of the model to predict the corresponding low,
median and high duration values. Following, I will discuss some deviances and give
possible explanation as to why the deviances are observed.
6.1.1 Information uncertainty: Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the information uncertainty model have restricted predictive
power due to the binary nature of the indicators used to explain formation delays. Figure
6.1 nuances these predictions, by showing how the information uncertainty model predicts
the 25th quantile, the median and the 75th quantile observations in-sample, grouped by
the countries used to estimate the model.
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Figure 6.1: In-sample predictions, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998). The y-axes indicate predicted
bargaining duration. The x-axes indicate the individual countries.
The model does not predict median observations in Iceland and Ireland well. The
rest of the Nordic countries, however, are almost perfectly predicted. The Scandinavian
countries have been characterized with high government stability, discussed for example
in Bergman and Strøm (2011, 51). The in-sample predictions shown in 6.1, hence, do
support the stability claim for Scandinavian countries.
Another trend is evident. With the exception of the Netherlands and Italy, all low
bargaining delays are over-predicted by the model. The opposite trend is shown in the 75th
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quantile plot, under-prediction is here the most common trait. This backs the expectation
that the model should be able to predict the median observations better than lower and
higher durations. Additionally, there are clear differences between the countries that are
well predicted and the countries that the information uncertainty model struggles more
with. The Scandinavian countries are at one end of the spectrum, while countries like the
Netherlands and Italy, countries with traditionally very complex political systems are at
the opposite side, gives the highest prediction errors.
Figure 6.2 shows interesting out-of-sample predictions. As the in-sample predictions,
the Nordic countries are the easiest for the information uncertainty model to predict
regarding the median values. But this is also true for countries such as Italy and Belgium
- two countries are often classified differently from the Nordic countries regarding the
political system.
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Figure 6.2: Out-of-sample predictions, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998).
The main causes for the increase in RMSE in the main analysis1 are the Netherlands
and Austria. The countries are the hardest to predict, no matter the level of duration.
One main cause is the change in observed bargaining duration. Table 3.1 in chapter 3
shows that the Netherlands have a mean of 90 bargaining days from 1990 to 2012, which
is a 12 day increase for the mean from 1945 to 1989. This point is also raised by De
1From 32.5 days in-sample to 36.5 days out-of-sample.
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Winter and Dumont (2008, 1521), which labels it as ”Dutch exceptionalism”, regarding
bargaining duration. 16 days behind the Netherlands comes Austria. The 39 day increase
from 1945 to 1989 in Austria is large. Evidently, this is a clear sign that the information
uncertainty model does not generalize well to new data because of changing political
circumstances, illustrated here by the heavy increase in bargaining duration after 1990.
Another sign which supports the conclusion that the model has poor predictive power
is the trend most clearly shown in the 75th quantile out-of-sample prediction plot, but
also for the two other levels. Here, the inability, because of the binary nature of the
model, to predict duration over 50 days is evident. And, because of the binary nature,
the RMSE is guided by the following large deviances.
For the main conclusions regarding the information uncertainty approach, it does well
at predicting median formation delays in-sample. The lower and higher durations are
where the large individual prediction error happens - and hence these formation delays
are most responsible for the in-sample RMSE of 32.5 days. The out-of-sample RMSE
is heavily guided by prediction errors from the Netherlands and Austria, on all levels of
duration.
6.1.2 Combining uncertainty and complexity: Sona Golder (2010)
The second part of chapter 4 demonstrated the decent capability of the combined
information uncertainty and bargaining complexity approach to predict in-sample. Figure
6.3 shows the same patterns. The combined model has limited prediction errors for
the median observations. Additionally, the model is also quite good at predicting
25th and 75th quantile durations. This is a sign of quality, and also what separates
the combined approach most clearly from the pure information uncertainty approach
regarding predictive power in-sample.
A clear exception is the Netherlands, which, as also shown for the information
uncertainty approach, is a hard country to predict. As mentioned above, these outliers
are hard for any model to predict. And, as pointed out before, the large errors from
Netherland inflates the value of the RMSE. The point is that Netherland contributes much
more to the high RMSE than for example the Scandinavian countries. The Scandinavian
countries are nearly perfectly predicted through all three stages.
An observation regarding the comparison between the two theoretical approaches is
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Figure 6.3: In-sample predictions, Sona Golder (2010). The y-axes indicate predicted bargaining
duration. The x-axes indicate the individual countries.
that the combined model predicts the Netherlands better than the information uncertainty
approach. One explanation is that the combined model has demonstrated its ability
to predict the natural distribution of bargaining duration better than the information
uncertainty approach. This has been traced to the binary nature of the information
uncertainty model compared to the combined model which includes continuous predictors
and interaction terms. Substantially, it means that the combined approach is the best at
predicting outliers such as the Netherlands. This, again, strengthens the conclusion from
chapter 4.
As reported for the in-sample predictions, the out-of-sample predictions, in figure 6.4,
has some countries with large prediction errors, Austria in particular. Austria was well
accounted for in-sample, as shown in figure 6.3. In light of the in- versus out-of-sample
discussion in this thesis, this case is illustrative. The combined model is well adept to
predict formation delays in Austria in-sample, showing prediction errors at maximum 13
days2. However, when the model is tested on the new sample, the prediction error for
Austria increases to a maximum of 66 days3. This, again, points towards there being a
change in political circumstances after 1999.
24 days for the 25th quantile, 8 days for median formation delays.
356.5 days for the 25th quantile and 64 days for median formation delays.
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Figure 6.4: Out-of-sample predictions, Sona Golder (2010).
Summing up the nuancing of the government formation models, the combined model
shows generally better predictive power than the information uncertainty approach, and
it also shows better ability to predict observations outside the median. This gives further
support for the conclusions reached in chapter 4 - that the more complex modeling of
bargaining duration has better predictive power than the more parsimonious modeling.
6.1.3 Importance of ideology: Warwick (1994)
The nuanced in-sample evidence from Warwick shows an interesting pattern, not reflected
in the full analysis in the first part of chapter 5. The ideological approach was shown
in chapter 5 to predict poorly in-sample. When broken down, as in figure 6.5, the
ideological approach seems to be well adept to predict government duration in the 75th
quantile. However, this comes as no surprise considering the high value of the intercept
in the original Weibull model, as discussed in chapter 5. A high intercept means that
the predictions will be somewhat biased towards the high durations. Hence, the large
prediction errors are mostly found for low durations.
In general, none of the countries are demonstrating significantly larger prediction
errors than others. This can be interpreted as the strong side of the model’s performance
in-sample. The model is able to more or less give identical predictions to cabinets across
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Figure 6.5: In-sample predictions, Paul Warwick (1994). The y-axes indicate predicted government
duration. The x-axes indicate the individual countries.
the 12 countries in the sample - this kind of consistency is a sign of quality regarding the
possibilities for generalizing the model to the whole sample.
Figure 6.6 shows substantial deviances for all three chosen levels of duration
out-of-sample. The in-sample predictions were shown to perform best on high durations.
From the out-of-sample results no such conclusions can be drawn. None of the three
stages can effectively be separated from the others regarding how close they are to the
observed government duration. The conclusion one can make is that the inference of
poor out-of-sample predictive power for the ideological approach is supported, even when
tested for different stages of the full duration distribution.
The country hardest to predict using the original model on new data is Luxembourg.
Luxembourg has prediction errors ranging from 600 to 800 days in the three stages. One
explanation for this can be that Luxembourg has the highest observed mean government
duration in the sample after 1989, see table 3.2. However, this does not represent a change
from before to after 1990, seeing as Luxembourg also had the highest mean duration from
1945 to 1989. A second explanation could be that there are a total of 5 cabinets recorded,
and 4 of them are right censored. It means that the cabinets from 1990 and onwards have
mostly ended due to a general election. Compared to the period between 1945 to 1989,
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Figure 6.6: Out-of-sample predictions, Paul Warwick (1994).
Luxembourg only had 1 out of 14 cabinets being right censored. This can support an
explanation that political realities are changing after 1990, a change which the ideological
approach does not generalize well to.
Sweden is almost as hard to predict as Luxembourg. The difference between the
median prediction error in-sample compared to the out-of-sample predictions is large,
from almost perfect predicted in-sample to over 700 days prediction error out-of-sample.
Again, a possible explanation can be found in the descriptive table in chapter 3. In the
original data, Sweden are only recorded to have 4 censored cabinets out of 22 in total,
i.e. the 4 cabinets are those which terminate due to a general election or some other
technical reasons. In the new data, 5 out of 7 cabinets are censored. Hence, relatively
speaking, this represents a large deviance from the observed duration before 1990. As the
explanation used before, this overweight of censored cabinets after 1990 means that it is
harder for the model to estimate the timing of the failure.
Summed up, the in-sample evidence shows a model capable of predicting every country
in the sample with constant quality. The out-of-sample evidence demonstrate that the
main conclusions from chapter 5 stands, with the exception of Luxembourg and Sweden.
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6.1.4 Strategic dissolution: Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
As shown in the second part of chapter 5, the competing risk model from Diermeier and
Stevenson (1999) does not predict government duration well. However, as shown in the
previous section, traces of quality can still be found by nuancing the predictions.
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Figure 6.7: In-sample predictions for both dissolution and replacement termination, Diermeier and
Stevenson (1999). The y-axes indicate predicted government duration. The x-axes indicate the individual
countries. The blue points indicate the observed government duration, both for the dissolution and the
replacement model.
The in-sample evidence for both the dissolution and replacement models is shown
in figure 6.7. The obvious trend that the replacement model is better able to predict
government duration compared to the dissolution model. This is mostly true both across
countries and across the levels of government duration, except for Norway and Ireland.
The two countries are consistently better predicted by the dissolution model compared to
the replacement model. Why does the dissolution model suddenly give better predictions
compared to the replacement model? An explanation of Ireland can be found in table
3.1. 14 out of 18 Irish cabinets from 1945 to 1989 are coded as dissolutions. Hence,
Ireland is an easier country to estimate the failure rate from, and therefore also easier to
predict. However, this explanation can be rejected with the Norwegian case - the country
does not practice parliamentary dissolution (Rasch 2004, 27). The next step is to nuance
the out-of-sample predictions, looking for traces of the same trend regarding Ireland and
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Norway.
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Figure 6.8: Out-of-sample predictions for both dissolution and replacement termination, Diermeier and
Stevenson (1999).
Nuancing the out-of-sample evidence, in figure 6.8, gives no news compared to the
description of the in-sample predictions above. The replacement model does generally
predict better than the dissolution model. Here, the trend of over-predicting is even more
imminent. The largest over-prediction error recorded is a 2112 day error for Germany,
for high levels of duration. Errors this large does not come alone, Austria does also
contribute to the large out-of-sample errors for the dissolution model. Consequently, the
RMSE values have been inflated.
As a final note, the inclusion of Norway in the sample of the dissolution model does not
make sense. The original article defends the inclusion by arguing that the article would
be more comparable to other studies (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999, 1060). However,
as mentioned above, Norway does not practice dissolution. Hence, when using Norway
in the dissolution approach, the model fails to account for its unique effect. A possible
consequence of which is that it introduces some bias regarding the results for the other
countries actually having the dissolution rule. This is a possible explanation of the results
shown for Norway. In all levels4, both in- and out-of-sample, the dissolution model predict
duration better than the replacement model.
4Except for the 75th percentile in-sample, where the replacement model is closest, minimally.
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Summing up government formation, the ideology approach from Warwick (1994) gave
a slightly more nuanced picture of the predictive ability of the model. It showed that it
could predict high durations quite well, and also that it predicted all countries in-sample
equally. The opposite can be said for the competing risk approach. The results shown
did not change the picture painted in chapter 5 - it only strengthened it, finding that
the replacement model performs better than the dissolution model, but that both models
have large individual prediction errors.
6.2 Alternative Prediction Error Metric
In the previous section I have pointed to specific countries with large individual prediction
errors. They were shown to guide the RMSE’s. This section will demonstrate a prediction
error calculation less vulnerable to large individual errors. Hence, the prediction error
estimate will show the prediction error without the large error weight found for countries
such as the Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg. The mean absolute error (MAE)
metric, discussed in 3.2.4, will be used for this.
The tables in this section sum up the RMSE and MAE scores from chapter 4 and
5. The RMSE scores will always be higher or equal to the MAE, never lower, precisely
because it does not give particular weight to large deviances. The evidence shown below
will be used as potentially further support to the conclusions reached in chapter 4 and 5.
6.2.1 Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Table 6.1 gives the prediction error measures for the information uncertainty approach.
The previous evaluation of the approach have shown that the Netherlands and Austria in
particular guide the RMSE value. The MAE scores illustrates this point. The in-sample
MAE has around 4.5 days of average error, while the out-of-sample MAE is around 8
days. It means a 28 days average prediction error decrease, respectively. This is a
significant reduction from the RMSE values. Additionally, the trend from the RMSE
values are replicated by the MAE. The out-of-sample predictions gives higher prediction
errors compared to the in-sample predictions.
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Table 6.1: RMSE and MAE, from evaluation of Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
RMSE MAE
In-sample 32.4 4.5
Out-of-sample 36.5 8.0
6.2.2 Golder (2010)
Table 6.2 shows the RMSE and MAE for the Golder (2010) evaluation. Above, the
Netherlands was identified as the country with the largest prediction errors, and hence
the greatest contributor to the RMSE value shown below. The MAE’s are shown to
significantly reduce the prediction errors, as expected. More interesting is that the
differences between in- and out-of-sample are reduced from 14 days between the RMSE
values, to around 2 days between the MAE values. One explanation is that the deviances
shown for Netherlands is not weighted for. Even if the large errors are controlled for, the
main results from the evaluation of the combined model hold.
Table 6.2: RMSE and MAE, from evaluation of Golder (2010)
RMSE MAE
In-sample 23.5 1.8
Out-of-sample 37.9 3.6
Comparing the information uncertainty to the combined approach, the MAE results
give further support to the main conclusion regarding the comparison in chapter 4 -
the combined approach by Golder (2010) has more predictive power than the more
parsimonious information uncertainty approach by Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998).
6.2.3 Warwick (1994)
Table 6.3 shows the RMSE and MAE for the ideological approach in Warwick (1994). The
ideological approach has previously been described as the model which most consistently
predicts all countries in the sample. I singled out Luxembourg, especially for the
out-of-sample results, as the country most heavily guiding the RMSE. From a difference
of 73 days error on average in RMSE, the MAE show 60 days differences between in- and
out-of-sample predictions. This relative reduction demonstrate the effect of removing the
weight on Luxembourg out-of-sample. When this is controlled for, the MAE show exactly
the same pattern as the RMSE reported in chapter 5. This illustrates that the findings
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for the ideological approach is not dependent on the prediction error metric used.
Table 6.3: RMSE and MAE, from evaluation of Warwick (1994)
RMSE MAE
In-sample 419 342
Out-of-sample 492 402
6.2.4 Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Table 6.4 shows the RMSE and MAE for the competing risk approach of Diermeier and
Stevenson (1999). Considering the large errors reported in chapter 5, and in section 6.1.4
the MAE show the expected reduction. For the dissolution model the MAE shows better
out-of-sample than in-sample predictive power. However, arguably, when the prediction
errors are as large as reported here, the sequence does not matter that much. The main
message for the dissolution model is that it does not predict well.
Table 6.4: RMSE and MAE, from evaluation of Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
RMSE MAE
Dissolution: In-sample 1202 1047
Dissolution: Out-of-sample 1213 1005
Replacement: In-sample 682 558
Replacement: Out-of-sample 573 471
For the replacement termination model, the RMSE show better out-of-sample
predictions compared to predictions in-sample. This is also found when using the MAE.
Basically, it means that the replacement model is better adapted to predict unseen
observations than the original observations. One explanation could be that the model
showed the best ability at predicting high durations. When the mean duration of the
cabinets in the sample has been shown to increase in the new data, the model hence
has a higher probability of making correct predictions contra the somewhat lower mean
cabinet duration before 1990. Another possible explanation is that, simply spoken, it is a
sign of the whole competing risk framework being hard to evaluate, and that the findings
presented from it are artefacts of a poorly fitted statistical model to the data,.
This section has in general shown support for the conclusions reached in chapter 4
and 5. The alternative prediction error metric has shown how large individual errors have
inflated the RMSE’s. However, the MAE’s demonstrated the same story as the RMSE’s,
except for the dissolution model in the competing risk framework.
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CHAPTER 7
Concluding Remarks
I have shown, through using classics in the fields of government formation and duration,
that none of the models are particularly good at predicting new observations. What
can explain this evidence? One explanation could be that the poor out-of-sample
predictions are caused by changing political realities after 1990. This argument has,
firstly, been supported descriptively by the mean observed increases in both bargaining
and government duration after 1990, compared to before 1990. Secondly, it has been
supported by showing that prediction errors increase when the original models are tested
on data from 1990 and onwards. This is hard evidence which must be considered both
in the development of the life cycle of governments and whether it needs a new approach
more adept to changing political circumstances.
Regarding parsimony versus complexity for the government formation literature, this
thesis does not support the call for going back to basics. The results from chapter 4
show a clear trend. The more complex theoretical approach, represented by the combined
information uncertainty and bargaining complexity approach of Golder (2010) has good
in-sample predictive power, but the out-of-sample predictions are somewhat weaker.
The more parsimonious approach by Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) had lower
predictive power over all compared to the combined model - which is also supported by
the robustness checks in chapter 6. Consequently, the more complex theoretical approach
has more predictive power than the more parsimonious approach.
For the government duration studies, claims have been directed towards even more
theoretical and empirical complexity. The demand for more complexity is not backed up
empirically, as shown in chapter 5. The more parsimonious approach by Warwick (1994) is
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significantly better at predicting the duration of new governments than the more complex
approach from Diermeier and Stevenson (1999), both in- and out-of-sample. Furthermore,
caution must be exercised regarding the competing risk model from Diermeier and
Stevenson. The statistical, and hence also theoretical, problem of predicting from the
competing risk framework is the heavy amount of censored cabinets, which mean less
information goes to estimating the failure rate, and hence the model becomes less fit for
making predictions.
Theoretically, this thesis have pointed towards using more complexity in the modeling
of the formation process and more parsimony in the modeling of the government duration
process. Methodologically, this thesis has argued for developments in the way government
formation and duration models should be evaluated empirically. One solution proposed
has been the out-of-sample prediction method. This thesis has, therefore, served as an
example of how researchers could improve their evaluations by utilizing the out-of-sample
method. Empirically, this thesis have contributed to the investigations of the life cycle of
governments by updating and expanding cabinet data1.
7.1 Implications and Future Research
The cabinet level data used to model the life cycle of governments is to a certain degree
too far removed from where the actual decisions are made. Here, I will make the case
for party-elite level data. Having behavioral data on the actual players involved in the
bargaining or, when the government has formed, or in life of the government duration,
yields a more nuanced and realistic picture of everyday politics. This is opposed to the
restrictions the data on the larger political context sets. Behavioral indicators can yield
better predictive power of models on the life cycle of governments, than the approach
chosen at the moment. In particular, gathering this data can help open up the literature;
behavioral indicators such as ambitions or other kinds of incentives, could help to explain
the observed variation of formation delays and government duration.
How are institutional indicators contributing to predicting the life cycle of
governments? All articles evaluated in this thesis have tested the effect of the investiture
rule. These kinds of institutional variables are often coded as binary predictors - a country
1For example by including Canada and the 4th republic of France to the ERD data, and coding cabinet
and legislative ideological data.
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either has the institutional arrangement or not. Consequently, all cabinets in a country
are coded the same way, which, in effect, means that an institutional indicator essentially
introduces fixed country effects on the statistical model. One consequence is that the
dummy variable constrains the variation in statistical model. This leads to inefficient
use of data. Another problem, more difficult to resolve, is that it becomes difficult to
entangle and interpret the effect of the institutional indicator. The dummy can represent
many things which separates one country from another, and not just the effect of the
constitutional constraint.
A possible solution for the investiture predictor is given in Cheibub et al. (2013).
Here, the authors argue for a more nuanced operationalization of the investiture rule.
This solution contributes to the possibility of observing more variation within countries,
and hence the effect of the constitutional constraint can more efficiently be estimated.
Furthermore, this approach makes it easier to entangle the effects from the institutional
indicators different form only being pure country fixed effects.
The nuancing of the investiture rule gives actuality to an implication demonstrated in
this thesis. As shown in chapter 4, for the information uncertainty model by Diermeier and
van Roozendaal (1998), binary predictors put natural limitations on the range of possible
predictions. The substantial effect of using only binary predictors is that it becomes
difficult to have naturally distributed predictions - meaning that there are difficulties in
evaluating how well the model actually performs. This points towards using more nuanced
operationalization, which enable the use of categorical predictors with more categories,
or also the use of continuous predictors.
The competing risk approach, theorized by Lupia and Strøm (1995) and empirically
validated by Diermeier and Stevenson (1999), represented a breakthrough in the
government duration literature. This thesis, however, has shown a weakness in the
approach. As a consequence of the poor ability of the Cox model to make predictions,
I chose the parametric Weibull model. Shown in chapter 5, this way of modeling the
competing risk approach does not give good predictions. I have traced the failure of
predictive ability to the restricted amount of cabinets which experience the two separate
modes of termination. The main problem follows a logic of theoretical richness and
empirical restrictions; there are only that many cabinets to test the theories.
Because of the restricted amount of cabinets coded as dissolutions or replacements,
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the consequence of implementing the competing risk approach is that there remains very
few cabinets actually contributing to the failure rate. As argued before, this makes the
intercept in the Weibull model biased towards finding long durations. This happens
because the model expects durations to last longer than the maximal observed duration,
due to the heavy amount of cabinets without an observed end point. Following Clarke
and Primo (2012), the quality of a theoretical model can be judged, amongst other
alternatives, by its ability to generate empirically testable hypothesis. This, arguably,
points in the disfavor of the competing risk approach because of the difficulty in evaluating
the predictions from the model.
82
APPENDIX A
Formation
Replication materials are fully available, send request to lars sutterud@hotmail.com.
The following models are Cox models if not indicated otherwise. The coefficients can
be interpreted as follows: A negative coefficient in the Cox models indicates that an
increase in the predictor means an increase in survival time. A positive coefficient in
the Cox models indicates decreasing survival time with an increase in the predictor. A
negative Weibull coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to decreased
duration. A positive coefficient indicates longer survival time. Zero indicates no effect
both for Cox and Weibull coefficients. In sum, this means that a negative Cox coefficient
is interpreted identical to a positive Weibull coefficient.
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A.1 Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Table A.1: Reduced model - Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998, 625). Standard errors are not given
in the original article. Replication(2) and Weibull(2) are without the identifiability indicator
Predictor Original Replication(1) Replication(2) Weibull(1) Weibull(2)
Post-Election -0.85 -1.02 (0.14) -1.06 (0.13) 1.14 (0.20) 1.16 (0.17)
Previous defeat -0.31 -0.33 (0.17) -0.30 (0.16) 0.44 (0.24) 0.41 (0.22)
Caretaker 0.54 0.25 (0.26) 0.22 (0.25) -0.15 (0.38) -0.17 (0.36)
Continuation 1.03 1.46 (0.17) 1.43 (0.16) -1.64 (0.22) -1.60 (0.21)
Identifiability 0.32 -0.04 (0.22) 0.14 (0.33)
Intercept 2.57 (0.17) 2.57 (0.15)
N 304 270 295 270 295
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics - Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Variable No Yes
Post-election 123 147
Previous Defeat 221 49
Caretaker 253 17
Continuation 206 64
Identifiability 245 25
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics for continuous variable, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Formation duration 270 29.64 38.42 0 272
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A.2 Golder (2010)
Table A.4: Model 4 - Sona Golder (2010, 20-21)
Cox Weibull
prop. hazards
Original Replication
Post-Election 1.03 (0.86) 1.07 (1.01) −2.11 (1.41)
Polarization 0.13 (0.71) −0.05 (0.83) −1.94 (1.27)
Effective No. parties −0.09 (0.10) −0.13 (0.14) 0.01 (0.19)
Investiture 0.37 (0.19) 0.45 (0.19) −0.27 (0.23)
Continuation 0.73 (0.17) 0.72 (0.19) −0.72 (0.23)
Single party majority 1.75 (0.17) 1.81 (0.17) −1.68 (0.18)
Post-El*Polarization −1.62 (0.81) −1.65 (0.92) 3.48 (1.36)
Post-El*Effective No. parties −0.29 (0.13) −0.29 (0.16) 0.34 (0.21)
Post-El*Investiture −0.20 (0.22) −0.22 (0.22) 0.16 (0.27)
Constant 3.78 (1.30)
Observations 383 383 383
Note: St.error in parantheses.
Table A.5: Descriptive statistics for binary variables - Golder (2010)
Variable No Yes
Post-election 155 228
Investiture 221 162
Single party majority 331 52
Continuation 280 103
Table A.6: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables, Golder (2010)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Formation duration 383 24.59 29.95 0 208
Polarization 383 0.50 0.22 0.14 1.24
Legislative parties 383 3.70 1.22 1.99 8.41
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Figure A.1: RMSE values from 5-fold cross validation, Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) and
Golder (2010). The y-axis shows the 5 different folds. The dashed lines represent the mean RMSE for the
two models, indicated by the respective color. The points indicates the RMSE value from the individual
folds, interpreted as the mean deviance in days between predictions and observations.
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B.1 Warwick (1994)
Table B.1: Original, replication and weibull estimates from Warwick (1994, 59)
Predictor Original Replication Weibull
Majority status -1.76 (0.21) -0.91 (0.17) 0.47 (0.10)
Postelection status -0.60 (0.17) -1.06 (0.16) 0.58 (0.09)
Investiture 0.68 (0.18) 0.32 (0.16) -0.15 (0.10)
Returnability 1.63 (0.49) 0.71 (0.48) -0.49 (0.30)
Left-Right diversity 0.25 (0.08) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
Clerical-Secular diversity 0.15 (0.06) -0.08 (0.05) 0.002 (0.03)
Regime Support diversity 0.17 (0.06) 0.22 (0.07) -0.13 (0.04)
Intercept 6.53 (0.22)
N 284 264 264
Table B.2: Descriptive statistics for binary variables - my data, Warwick (1994)
Variable No Yes
Majority status 100 164
Post-election 117 147
Investiture 126 138
Table B.3: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables, Warwick (1994)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Formation duration 264 666.27 497.78 2 1,935
Returnability 264 0.71 0.14 0.38 0.89
Left-Right diversity 264 17.73 20.08 0.00 81.43
Clerical-Secular diversity 264 1.65 1.80 0.00 7.43
Regime Support diversity 264 0.97 1.47 0.00 6.64
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B.2 Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Table B.4: Comparison between original results from Diermeier and Stevenson and replication using
my data
Dissolution Replacement
Original Replication Original Replication
Majority status −1.07 (0.24) −1.11 (0.27) −1.36 (0.26) −1.00 (0.22)
Post-Election −2.00 (0.25) −1.05 (0.26) −0.16 (0.22) −0.77 (0.21)
Investiture −0.06 (0.21) −0.12 (0.26) 1.03 (0.24) 0.45 (0.22)
Returnability 1.12 (0.51) −0.88 (0.76) 1.52 (0.65) 2.03 (0.71)
Left-Right Range 0.20 (0.11) 0.005 (0.01) 0.24 (0.11) −0.01 (0.01)
Clerical-Secular Range 0.02 (0.08) −0.14 (0.11) 0.14 (0.08) 0.06 (0.07)
Regime Support Range −0.19 (0.16) 0.23 (0.14) 0.30 (0.07) 0.28 (0.09)
Observations 268 259 268 259
Note: Partial likelihood estimates.
St.errors in parantheses.
Table B.5: Comparison between Cox and Weibull using my data, Diermeier and Stevenson model 3 and
4 (1999:1063)
Dissolutions Replacements
Cox Weibull Cox Weibull
prop. hazards prop. hazards
Majority status −1.11 (0.27) 0.61 (0.18) −1.00 (0.22) 0.52 (0.13)
Post-Election −1.05 (0.26) 0.60 (0.17) −0.77 (0.21) 0.46 (0.12)
Investiture −0.12 (0.26) 0.07 (0.18) 0.45 (0.22) −0.25 (0.13)
Returnability −0.88 (0.76) 0.65 (0.54) 2.03 (0.71) −1.24 (0.43)
Left-Right Diversity 0.005 (0.01) −0.001 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.005 (0.004)
Clerical-Secular Diversity −0.14 (0.11) 0.06 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) −0.06 (0.04)
Regime Support Diversity 0.23 (0.14) −0.14 (0.10) 0.28 (0.09) −0.16 (0.05)
Constant 6.19 (0.38) 7.50 (0.33)
Observations 259 259 259 259
Note: Partial likelihood estimates.
St.errors in parantheses.
Table B.6: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Formation duration 259 644.78 483.69 2 1,748
Returnability 259 0.71 0.14 0.38 0.89
Left-Right diversity 259 15.96 19.77 0.00 81.43
Clerical-Secular diversity 259 1.39 1.71 0.00 7.43
Regime Support diversity 259 0.89 1.46 0.00 6.64
Table B.7: Descriptive statistics for binary variables, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Variable No Yes
Majority status 103 156
Post-election 115 144
Investiture 126 133
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Figure B.1: Variability of CV-estimates, Warwick (1994) and Diermeier and Stevenson (1999). The
x-axis shows the RMSE, the dotted lines show the mean RMSE for each model according to their color.
The y-axis show the results of the 5 different folds. The points indicates the RMSE value from the
individual folds, interpreted as the mean deviance in days between predictions and observations.
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